{"id":8716,"date":"2020-08-21T09:34:10","date_gmt":"2020-08-21T09:34:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/barq-rs.com\/?p=8716\/"},"modified":"2021-09-22T11:37:53","modified_gmt":"2021-09-22T08:37:53","slug":"the-conflict-in-kosovo-and-syria-in-the-context-of-tito-and-hafiz-al-assads-policies-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/barq-rs.com\/en\/the-conflict-in-kosovo-and-syria-in-the-context-of-tito-and-hafiz-al-assads-policies-2\/","title":{"rendered":"THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO AND SYRIA IN THE CONTEXT OF TITO AND HAFIZ AL ASSAD’S POLICIES"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

THE\nCONFLICT IN KOSOVO AND SYRIA IN THE CONTEXT OF TITO AND HAFIZ AL ASSAD’S\nPOLICIES <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

  <\/strong>(COMPARATIVE STUDY)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO AND SYRIA IN THE CONTEXT OF\nTITO AND HAFEZ AL-ASSAD’S POLICIES <\/p>\n\n\n\n

(COMPARATIVE STUDY)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Salah Yossef<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Global Affairs Program<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thesis Supervisor: Dr.Sean Cox<\/p>\n\n\n\n

June 2019, 70 pages<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This\nstudy addresses a set of Tito and Hafez Al-Assad’s policies provided a fertile\nground to the conflict in Syria and Kosovo, at the time some of studies and\nmedia are still portraying these periods and policies as the \u201cstable period\u201d or\n\u201cSuccessful policies\u201d. However, it did not take into account the suppression of\nmany demands and rights related to the issues of freedom and social justice.\nMoreover, the imposition of the one-party ideology \u201ccommunism and socialism\u201d\nregardless of the ethnicities and components of peoples. These policies did not\ndiscredit by all segments of society in Syria and Kosovo, rather it led to\nincreased racial and ethnic dissonance which sparked violent conflict in later\nstages. Both Syria and Kosovo were in a temporary phase of social, political\nand economic stability imposed by the iron fist and it has fallen short of\nsustainable stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keywords:<\/strong> \nConlict, Syria, Kosovo, Serbia, Jozip Tito, Hafez Al-Assad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00d6ZET<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

T\u0130TO VE HAFEZ ESAD\u2019IN POL\u0130T\u0130KALARI BA\u011eLAMINDA KOSOVA VE SUR\u0130YE ARASINDAK\u0130 \u00c7ATI\u015eMA<\/p>\n\n\n\n

(KAR\u015eILA\u015eTIRMALI \u00c7ALI\u015eMA)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Salah Yossef<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Y\u00fcksek Lisans Program\u0131<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tez Dan\u0131\u015fman\u0131: Dr. Sean Cox<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Haziran 2019, 70 sayfa<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma, Tito ve Hafez Esad\u2019\u0131n, Suriye ve Kosova \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na verimli bir zemin sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in birtak\u0131m politikalar\u0131n\u0131 anlat\u0131yor, ayn\u0131 zamanda medya ve baz\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar hala bu d\u00f6nemleri ve politikalar\u0131 \u2018dura\u011fan d\u00f6nem\u2019 yada \u2018ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 politikalar\u2019 olarak tasvir ediyor. Ama \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck ve sosyal adalet konular\u0131 ile ilgili baz\u0131 hak ve talep bask\u0131lar\u0131 hesaba kat\u0131lmad\u0131. Dahas\u0131 halklar\u0131n bile\u015fenleri ve etnik k\u00f6kenlerinin dikkate al\u0131nmadan tek partili \u2018kom\u00fcnizm ve sosyalizm\u2019 y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc. Bu politikalar, Kosova ve Suriye\u2019deki toplumun t\u00fcm katmanlar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan itibars\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmad\u0131, daha do\u011frusu ileri d\u00fczeylerde k\u0131v\u0131lc\u0131mlanan \u015fiddet \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 olan\u00a0 artan \u0131rksal ve etnik uyumsuzlu\u011fa neden oldu. Hem Suriye hem Kosova, demir yumruk taraf\u0131ndan maruz b\u0131rak\u0131lan sosyal, politik ve ekonomik dura\u011fanl\u0131k a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ge\u00e7ici bir evrede ve bu, yetersiz olan s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclebilir dura\u011fanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fcyor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anahtar Kelimeler:<\/strong>\n\u00c7at\u0131\u015fma, Suriye, Kosova, S\u0131rbistan, Jozip Tito, Be\u015far Esad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ABBREVIATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

KLA                :        \n Kosovo Liberation Army<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NATO             :           North\nAtlantic Treaty Organization forces<\/p>\n\n\n\n

CPY                            :           Communist Party of Yugoslavia<\/p>\n\n\n\n

CPA                <\/strong>:           <\/strong>The Communist Party of\nAlbania<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

PLO                :           Palestine\nLiberation Organization
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    The\nend of the Cold War is considered a significant turning point in the nature of\nthe international conflict, as the traditional inter-State conflict turned into\nto be intra-State conflict within the same state, which led to the emergence of\nthe ethnic groups in the Balkan states, especially after the collapse of The\nSocialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It collapsed as a result of the\nfailure of the regime in managing the internal changes within the state; hence\nthe marginalized minorities rebelled against the integration\nattempts made towards the socialist ideology as they have maintained the ethnic\nand religious identity as a result of the marginalization. Hatred policies and\noppression that they suffered in particular when Slobodan Milosevic came to\npower in former Yugoslavia, then the Serbs have taken over all leadership\npositions in the territory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Accordingly, the Kosovo Albanian\ncommunity has suffered a greater oppressive policy that reached its peak after\nthe termination of autonomy of the Albanians in the territory in 1989 by Serbs;\nhence, the Kosovo community has divided into two main components from Albanians\nand Serbs, while the Serbs accessed to the leadership positions in the\nterritory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Political regime could not meet the\nsubstantive demands for Albanians. At the same time, Slobodan Milosevic has\nmade all his efforts to what it could be mean \u201cthe serbianzation\u201d of\nall political, social, and economic aspects of the state through using the\noppressive and exclusionary measures. As a result, the Albanians have staged\npeaceful protests against these practices, which developed rapidly through\ncarrying the weapons by Albanians. As consequence, they established what is\ncommonly known as (Kosovo Liberation Army) (KLA), which fought to liberate the\nterritory of Kosovo from Serbs with the assistance of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces (NATO). For these\nreasons, the conflict in Kosovo was the beginning of the end for the communist\nand Socialist regime, where Kosovo issue has proven the failure of such a\nstrategy to manage the affairs of the main components of the state that\nconsists of Albanians, Serbs, Muslims, Christians, Orthodox, and Catholics. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In Syria that experienced the\nrevolutions and uprisings, one after the other against its political regimes\ndecades ago, this began against the French occupation at first and continued up\nto the present. however; none of the attempts made were successful for various\nreasons, including: the failure of revolutions to introduce an alternative plan\n(all-inclusive) that guarantee the rights of all segments of Syrian People of\nall sects, and the eradication and elimination of the national plans that aim\nat creating a sovereign independent state in Syria that provide the equal rights\nfor all people of all sects. Syria has suffered from its political elites who\nare simply an integral part of international and regional mobilization, as they\nserved the interests of foreign countries instead of their home country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The Arab Baath Socialist Party has\nemerged by Hafez Al-Assad, whom he was a part of world socialist system at that\ntime, as he adopted the ideology of exclusion against the prominent figures\nbelonging to various intellectual currents that disagree with him. This\nexclusion policy extended even to National Socialists and Communists, then he\nrelied on stirring up the sectarian conflict for the purpose of maintaining his\nrule. After Hafez Al-Assad’s death, his son Bashar came to the power to promote\nthese policies, the situation has exploded in Syria during his reign at the\nbeginning of the year of 2011, when the demonstrators staged a peaceful\nprotests for simple demands, however; the peaceful protects developed to\nmilitary confrontation among various revolutionary forces of Syrian people and\nthe regime and its regional and international allies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Taking into account the differences in\ngeography and timing, the military confrontation in both Syria and Kosovo is\nconsidered the height of the conflict, this difficult situation that Syria\nreached, came after the discrimination among the parties to the conflict that\ntheir ideology was based on an ideological, ethnic and sectarian basis. These\ntough circumstances that Syria goes through, has resulted from the policy of\nthe governing elite which described by John\nYoung as \u201cethnically based elite that use the state to protect its\nmaterial interests and creates a false harmony through imposing its culture and\nideology on the peoples of these countries\u201d(Hamdan& Pearson2014.P271).\nFurthermore, the existing regime has sometimes failed or rejected to secure\neven a tight margin of rights and freedom for the population segments belonging\nto the ethnic origin as the case with Syria and the territory of Kosovo. These\nregimes were unable to respond to the significant questions pertaining to the\nidentity, as they replaced the matters of identity by the ideology of\none-party, security solution, repression, and violence. Such tough policy led\nto the loss of confidence among the components of people, which pushed them to\ngather and cluster in the narrow circle – ethnic and sectarian groups – which\nled to the promotion of loyalty to sectarian groups and race instead of the\nloyalty to the state. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    These repressive regimes have not\nactually adopted any program to build a society based on \u201cethics of dialogue\ninstead of conflict\u201d (Meghrani2017.p1) [1]<\/sup><\/a><\/sup> or\nengaged the marginalized local ethnic groups that suffered from cultural and\npolitical oppression within certain range of democracy, which enable all people\nto express their cognitive and cultural thoughts, and backgrounds, and enables\nthem either to exchange the discussions around acceptable suggestions from all\nof them (Hayhoh2013.p1)[2]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

     <\/strong>
    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2.\nTHEORETICAL FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Nahla Hamdan, The specialized author in\nthe political conflict management and mediation, as well as the author\nFrederic.S Pearson have previewed in their book that entitled: \u201cArab Approaches\nTo Conflict Resolution\u201d, the content of the conflict management and the features\nof the conflicts in the Arab world whether such conflicts was between Arab\ncountries themselves or between an Arab country against foreign country, or\neven intra-State conflicts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The author indicated to some statics\nthrough analyzing some data obtained, and mentioned, \u201cAbout 55 percent of the\nArab-Arab violence includes an ethnic war, and 45 percent did not include\nethnic war. With regard to Arab violence against non-Arab violence, there was\n100 percent of ethnic war, compared with 77 percent of non-Arab violence\nagainst non-Arab violence. The author attributes this findings, compared to the\nglobal percentage, to the tendency towards ethnic diversity in the Arab States,\nor to the success of the governments either in suppressing ethnic hostility\nwithout causing a comprehensive war, or through using the traditional means in\nsettling the ethnic conflicts without war (Hamdan& Pearson2014.p132). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The second option is considered the most\npreferable option for the Arab leaders who have multi-ethnic groups in their\ncountries, as they deliberately use the principle of \u201cdivide et imperia\u201d, and impose the security solution instead of\nmanaging the ethnic components in the context of sustainable development that\ncould promote the national unity and would enhance the well-being and adherence\nof their communities, and pave the way towards mutual confidence between the\ngovernments and their communities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In Yemen, for instance; Yemeni President\nAli Abdullah Saleh, \u201cwho was dubbed as the \u201cone\nwho dances on the heads of snakes\u201d which mean his policies depended on\ndriving a wedge between one ethnic group and another, a policy that he pursued\nduring his rule, led to his death during the civil war between the militias of\nHouthi and pro-government militias. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The situation in Yemen like most of The\nArab States, as these policies provided only the fertile ground for the\nconflicts that we witnessed in the Arab world after Jasmine Revolution in\nTunisia. It should be noted that This revolution has revolutionized the concept\nof \u201cstability\u201d that the Arab States have described themselves under the\ngovernments that harnessed the ethnic groups for the purpose of stabilizing their rule. However, the Arab\nrevolutions have confirmed the fragility of the concept \u201c stability\u201d Because it\nwas imposed by force, and compelled the major powers in the world to reconsider\ntheir relations supporting these regimes, albeit indirectly, on the pretext of\nmaintaining security and peace in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The two authors provided a number of\nArab-Arab conflict models, such as the Yemeni Civil War (1962-1970) and the\nrole of Arab states such as Saudi Arabia during the reign of King Faisal and\nEgypt during the reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the conflict between the south\nand northern Yemen. They also referred to the role of regional mobilization in\nfueling and settling the internal conflicts, in addition to the Arab conflicts\nwith non-Arabs, such as the Sudanese civil war between the north and the south,\nat the time when the south was striving to\nseparate, where it is inhabited by a group of non-Arab African tribes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The author focused on\nthe role of the gender in peacekeeping process in the Arab world, as the\nabsence of women from the political party agendas and civil society\norganizations have resulted in the absence of women voice at the negotiation\ntable, Which led to the absence of women rights in conflict-management\nprocesses, while women are the most affected victims during the conflict\nthrough harassment, persecution, extortion and sexual assault. This is what\nhappened in Syria during the war between the armed groups and the Syrian\nregime. The regime harassed many women at the checkpoints erected inside and\noutside the cities, not to mention extortion and sexual assault in order to\nobtain confessions during the investigation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In the context of settling the\nArab-conflicts under the revolutions of the Arab Spring, the author refers in\nthe 7th<\/sup> chapter of the book, to the Arab Spring and the variable\nfactors pertaining to \u201c the outbreak of the conflicts and the settlement of the\nconflicts in the Middle East\u201d (Hamdan & Pearson2014.p323). The author\nstressed the end of the validity of these kinds of regimes in the Arab World,\nalongside their traditional policy in governing the peoples, that concentrated\nin the use of power and the exclusion of economic and social reforms, if any\nreforms, they would be in narrow range, in the first place, in order to satisfy\nthe Western countries and in line with some personal interests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The authors mention three categories of\nthe Arab states the first one is: the \u201chistoric state\u201d that is established\nbased on the political patronage, especially in oil-rich states, where the\npatronage is based on the existing inducement of kinship, tribes, and clan\nrelations. The second one is the \u201cmodern state\u201d which includes a group of\ntechnocrats educated in the West, who are working in every level of the state\nbureaucracy. The third one is \u201cthe state of repression\u201d which is above the\nsociety and law, as it could sometimes create its own laws to protect the\nruling class, the political elite, and the owners’ classes\u201d\n(Hamdan&Pearson2014.p324). In the three categories mentioned above, the\nfirst and last objective was to soften resentment and impatience towards the\nruling regime, which created a set of grievances that did not receive a fair\nhearing with the ruling elites throughout their tenure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Accordingly, there are various reasons\nfor the dissatisfaction and discontent, which lead to one result; more\nconflict, tension, and instability. \u201cThe origins of the Arab Spring may back to\nthe early the 19th century when the Arabs\nbegan to rise from the yoke of foreign colonial domination, where the\nindependent Arab states, emerging after decades of Western colonialism,\npreferred to show \u201cmanifestations of power, so they seem to have paid little\nattention to their social, economic and intellectual foundations\u201d (Hamdan &\nPearson 2014.p324). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The authors of the book, quoted from the\nbook \u201cThe collapse of middle eastern authoritarianism\u201d that written by the\nauthors Salamey and Pearson: The local techniques used by the powerful rulers,\nin both modern and traditional nationalist regimes to evoke the fear and to\nstrengthen the pillars of their rule, such techniques that their effectiveness\nbegan to erode by the end of the twentieth century:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    1. The information campaigns led by\nthe regimes, aim at charging the opposition with treason, such campaigns is\nprepared against the opponents to accuse them of conspiring with Americans,\nBritish, Zionists and sometimes with the Soviets and the Iranians for the\npurpose of bringing the new colonialism. Over time especially in the\npost-colonial phase, these propaganda tricks gradually lost their ability to\npersuade.<\/li>
    2. Accusing the opponents of\nviolating the sanctity of the state or apostasy. This is the method used by\nconservative nationalist regimes, which adopted the concepts of thinking about\ndifferent groups, women, political equality and social rights. The traditional\nstates in the region have tended to use aspects of statutory laws, and have\ngiven their states and rulers a kind of sanctity or transcendence for their\nsurvival. <\/li>
    3. The tactics adopted by the updated\nauthoritarian regimes in the region, played on people’s fear of Islamic threat\nand public chaos. It is assumed that the extremism is directed against \u201cmoderate\u201d\nauthoritarian regimes, whether they are some cases a scholar or royal regimes\n(Hamdan&Pearson2014.p329).<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      The above three techniques apply to\ninternal and external policies of the Syrian regime under the reign of Hafez\nal-Assad and his son Bashar, while he was rising the slogans of resistance\nagainst Israel, there were many secret negotiations made to protect Israel’s\nborders. Hence, The sanctity of the ruling regime that it surrounded itself\nwith is eroding, as it raises the slogans of non-handling with the anti-Arab\nStates represented by Israel, according to the widespread claims published in\nthe official media and state institutions (service, security and military\ninstitutions). In contrast, there are many economic, military and cultural\nagreements signed with Iran, which it is well-known for its aggressive stance\ntowards the Arab nationalism, as it still occupies Arab territories. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In the reference to the Albanian-Serbian\nconflict in Kosovo, Dr. Mohamed Arnaout mentioned in his book that entitled \u201cKosovo\nbetween the past and present\u201d, the Serbian role in this conflict, especially\nafter the success of the last Albanian uprising, in the summer of 1912, to take\ncontrol of the main cities in the province of \u201cQusoh\u201d including the capital\nAskop, which forced the Ottoman government on 18 August 1912, to accept the\nuprising’s demands )the\nself-government for the Albanians in Kosovo). The Albanian-Ottoman agreement\nwhich means the continuation of the Ottoman rule in Balkan, did not satisfy the\nSerbian far-right circles and the neighbouring countries, which eventually led\nto First Balkan War against the Ottoman Empire, that ended with the capture of \u201cKosovo\u201d\n(Arnaout 2008.p54)  by Serbian forces\nthat consider Kosovo as sacred territory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      At this point, the fundamental causes\nfor the Albanian-Kosovo conflict on Kosovo, has begun with the policies of \u201cthe\nserbianzation\u201d that aimed at the quick getting rid of undesirable majority\n(Albanian), In order highlight the scared historic character of the Serbian\npresence on the ground which would justify their demands to the de facto\nannexation of the lands. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In this context, the Serbian authorities\nforced the Muslim Albanians (95%) and the Catholics (5%) to convert to\nOrthodoxy, by this way; melting them into the Orthodox-Serbian character could\nbe easy (Arnaout 2008.p56). In this regard, the Religious nationalism had a\nprominent role in this conflict, however, it was not only religious conflict\nbetween Muslim and Christian but also was Christian-Christian conflict. As in\nthe case of many Arab nationalist regimes, especially the Syrian regime, which\nrelies on the idea of the integration and strengthening the nationalist\nsentiment despite the existence of multiple nationalist and ethnic groups in Syria,\nwhere many other non-Arab ethnic components has been marginalized by using the\nsame means of playing on demographic changes and creating inter-ethnic disputes\namong the components of Syrian people. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In Kosovo, the settlement policy has\nbegun after issuing the decree of February 1914, that entitled \u201cDecree on the\nSettlement of Newly Liberated\u201d In which the government promised the Serbian\nsettlers granting each family of them a piece of land, in addition to the\nexemption from tax (Arnaout 2008.p56).<\/sup> Kosovo has obtained the\nself-government during the First World War, when Austrian forces penetrated\nBelgrade, then Kosovo entered into the scope of the state of Yugoslavia in\n1918, afterwards the Albanians lost the self-government that they enjoyed after\nthe entry and defeat of the French troops in 1918, accordingly; the Serbian\nrepressive policies against Albanians re-emerged again through the eradication\nof all the Albanian cultural and educational manifestations obtained under the\nAustrian rule, alongside with the continuation of settlement policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In an important development in response\nto the Serbian policies, the activates of the left-wing militants affiliated to\nthe political opposition has escalated against the violent repression practiced against the Albania,\nwhich paved the way to the emergence of armed Albanian resistance (Kachaks). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      After the Italian occupation to Albania\nin 1939, and the earlier understandings around the division of Albania between\nItaly and Yugoslavia in order to get rid of the Kosovo problem, the World War\nII has broken out, in which Yugoslavia was invaded by Germans and Italians in\n1941, accordingly; the Greater Albania has been formed which includes Kosovo\nand other areas where the Albanians live (Macedonia and southern Montenegro),\nbut a liberation war broke out at the far ends of former Yugoslavia, which led\nby Yugoslav Communist Party, that established the Communist Party of Albania, which called for\nlaunching a \u201cpublic liberation war\u201d As a result, the Albanian people divided\ninto two main groups; the first group includes the proponents of the idea of\nthe party and the second group includes the opponents who thought that the\nproblem of Kosovo has been settled by the unity with Albania(Arnaout 2008.p60).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      There were many proponents to the idea\nof the establishment of \u201cAnti-Fascist Assembly of the People’s Liberation of\nKosovo\u201d which included a various components of the people from Kosovo, and\nheaded by the Albanian President (Mohamed Khouja) (Arnaout 2008.p60). the\nassembly issued a historic decision stating that the territory of Kosovo is \u201c a\nterritory inhabited by a majority of the Albanian people who are always desire\nto unite with Albania, and It is necessary to clarify the way in which the\nAlbanian people are achieving their ambition: a common war with the people of\nYugoslavia against the Nazi occupier\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The first dissension occurred among the\nleaders of \u201c Liberation Army\u201d that participated in the \u201cliberation\u201d of Kosovo,\nas they considered that their mission has ended in Kosovo at the time of\nobtaining the self-determination, While the leadership of the Yugoslav\nCommunist Party believes that these forces must continue to fight until the\nliberation of all Yugoslav territory is completed, for this reason; The \u201cmilitary\nadministration\u201d has been imposed by the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist\nParty after the elimination of counter-revolution \u201c the dissidents\u201d, hence the\ndecision of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People’s Liberation of Kosovo to\nunite with Albania has been disregarded. After that date, Kosovo forcibly\njoined Serbia \/ Yugoslavia rule under the president Tito ‘rule, and granted the\nself-government within the scope of \u201cFederal Republic of Serbia\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Kosovo had entered into the empty\npromises phase once again, and a new phase of the oppressive policies against\nAlbanian majority under the rule of the president Tito. The emergence of Tito’s\npopularity raised the concerns of Stalin whom issued a statement through the\nCommunist Information Bureau in 1948, the statement included the deviation of\nYugoslav leadership from the Marxist line, the Albanian president Anwar Khouja\ndeclared his support to that statement for purpose of getting rid of Serbian\nleaders whom have a close relationship with Tito and to obtain the his power as\na president at that time, the Kosovo Albanians is caught between the hammer of\nthe communist regime of Stalin and Tito, which forced the Albanian part of\nKosovo to face its own destiny alone, as the security agencies activities has\nincreased against Kosovo Albanians, which returned Serbian character again on\nKosovo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Many prominent Albanian\nfigures have been arrested in Kosovo in the ground of the sympathy for Albanian\nregime, and many of the participants in the founding conference were executed\non 1 January 1944. Afterwards; the expanded meeting of Preparatory Committee\npertaining to the Albanian Communist Party has convened, and it revealed a\nseries of abuses practiced by security agencies, hence a new phase of political\nreforms has begun, but the Serbs constructed it as a new defeat in Kosovo\nsimilar to 1389. Kosovo was granted autonomy under the 1974 Constitution by\nwhich Albanians could engage in cultural, educational and economic activities\napart from Serbs intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The phase of d\u00e9tente\nwas short-lived, as Tito did not present fundamental and long-term solutions\nthat guarantee Albanians’ rights in Kosovo apart from stirring up the\nnationalist sentiment of the Serb party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      All of these benefits that the Albanians\nobtained, have ended immediately after the death of Tito, then The country\nentered into severe economic crises throughout the country, for this reason a\ngroup of students at the University of Pristina staged a protest against the\nservices of the university, which transformed into political demands calling\nfor the reunification of all Albanians people under one state (Arnaout 2008. p60).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The chairmanship of the central\ncommittee of the party considered the student’s protest under the pressure of\nSerbia and Macedonia as a \u201ccounter revolution\u201d and any kind of these protests\nis considered illegal act. accordingly, The Serbian forces launched a massive\nsecurity campaign against the Albanians included thousands of the students and\nprofessors (Arnaout 2008. p60), and fueled the public opinion against the\nstudent demands \u201cthe counter revolution\u201d as the participants calling for the\ncondemnation of \u201cthe counter revolution\u201d and the dismissing them from the\nparty. The political offences included 10 thousand persons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In conclusion, the Serbian leadership,\nafter the death of President Tito, found an opportunity to regain the control\nof Kosovo and regain its dominant status, as it deliberately holds the educated\nelite the responsibility for the previous events to justify its intervention in\nthe education, in order to clean everything related to the spirit of Albanian\nnationalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In 1986 in Serbia, the Serbian leader\nSlobodan Milosevic has taken over the party’s presidency, as he fueled the\nnationalist spirit of Serbia and strengthened the hostility against the\nAlbanians. He called for the unification of Serbs in neighboring countries,\nwhich means his desire to exercise control over of Montenegro and Bosnia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Milosevic accepted the invitation of the\nSerbs of Kosovo to attend and listen to their demands in the district of \u201cKosovo\nPolje\u201d, where the battle of Kosovo took place in 1389. During the meeting with\nthe furious Serbs with Kosovo leadership, Milosevic fabricated a clash between\nthe Kosovo police forces and the Serb participants, which was the reason for\nrise of Milosevic. After that date, he removed all his opponents and imposed\namendments to the constitution to end self-government in Kosovo which ended by\nthe end of 1989. As a result, thousands of demonstrators protested in the\nstreets in Kosovo in response to his decisions, which let to deaths and\ninjuries and the declaration of a state of emergency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      A new campaign against intellectuals\nbegan with the detention of dozens of them and dozens of them were also killed,\nthen the first Democratic Party has established (Democratic League of Kosovo)\nwhich elected the leader Ibrahim Rugova as president, and thousands of former\nmembers of the Communist Party joined the new party to become a platform\nagainst Serbian domination. The majority of members of the Kosovo People’s\nAssembly (KPC) met outside the building after Serbian police prevented them\nfrom entering, to approve the \u201cconstitutional declaration\u201d which provides for\nKosovo’s people the independence and the equality in other federal unit in\nYugoslavia(Arnaout 2008.p84). This led to the increase in tension and the\nPeople’s Assembly has been dissolved in addition to the government upon a\nresolution of Serbian People’s Assembly. For this reason, the crisis in Kosovo\nto enter a new phase of conflict, as the majority of members of the People’s\nAssembly of Kosovo rejected the resolution of dissolution the assembly and the\ngovernment through declaring the \u201cConstitution of the Republic of Kosovo\u201d in\nSeptember 1990.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The author Mohamed Arnaout previewed a\nnumber of Serbian policies and historical contexts that the Albanians lived\nunder Ottoman, Austrian, and Italian and German rule. And then under the\nYugoslav government before and after World War II. all the political elite that\nruled Kosovo played on that paper to achieve their personal interest and to\nstabilize their rule, and this what the Albanian suffered from at various times\neven under the rule of Tito, in which Kosovo is being thought lives in a phase\nof well-being and stability. The aggregation of these polices let to a fertile\nground for future phase of endless conflict, these policies only contributed in\ndeepening the internal differences that were in favor of the ruling regime as\nthe case with Syria during the reign of Hafez al-Assad. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Dr. Jamal Wakim, in his book \u201cThe Great\nPower Struggle on Syria,\u201d described these policies as the secret of the success\nfor a leader like Hafez al-Assad, as he portrays the playing on the\ncontradictions and minorities factors as the keys to a successful policy in\nrunning the country. He did not refer to the consequences of these policies on\nthe Syrian internal situation in the distant future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      He focused also in his book on the\ngeo-strategic importance of Syria, which has been the strategic depth of many\ninternational powers since the dawn of history. Syria’s fate has become a\nbattleground between Mesopotamia and those who rule it, and the Anatolia or\nwhoever rule it, and Egypt or whoever rule it, because of its importance to\neach of those regional powers at that time as a safety valve for all of them\nand the mere fall of Syria in favor of any of these forces is considered the\nbeginning of the end for the others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      At a later stage during the World War,\nthe international power that was being struggling on Syria was crystal clear,\nAt the time when the British forces of the crown of India sought to extend its\ninfluence on Syria to guarantee its strategic depth from the German influence\nthat invaded France, at the same time, when the German planes supported the\nKilani revolutions in Iraq in May 1941 against the British from Syrian\nterritory, and before that either at the time of the French occupation to Syria\nthat attempted to control Syria in the form of war outside the European\nborder.With regard to the political life in Syria, there was no political\nproject in proportion to the social and intellectual structure of the Syrian\nsociety. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      In this context, Syria suffered from\nmany conflicts between the partisan currents because of Ideological differences\nthat have not been and will not be provide the Syrian people anything. The\nfounder of the nationalist social party, Anton Saada, in eighties of the past\ncentury, influenced by French nationalism and the French concept of the nation,\nwhile his rival party Al Baath, founded by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar, was\ninfluenced by the concept of German nationalism. 100<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Dr. Jamal Wakim says in his book \u201cThe\nGreat Power Struggle on Syria\u201d Al Assad has ruled Syria for a long period of\nthe time as a result of his ability to manage these political balances\neffectively (Wakim 2012.p129), in this context the author focuses on the\noutcomes that brought Syria in this empty balances, these balances would not\nhave been for the security agencies, whom are keen to stabilize the regime\nthrough various repressive means such as fueling the internal conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Lanhue S Shan, pointed out in his study\nthat entitled \u201cAnalysis of Tito\u2019s Policies On Ethnic Conflict: The Case of\nKosovo<\/em>\u201d, the most important policies that led to the strengthening of\nethnic disputes in Yugoslav Federation in general and specifically between\nSerbs and Kosovo Albanians. Tito relied on three major policies to deal with\nKosovo. These policies included; the economic, social, political, and migration\nsituations. However; he has neither succeeded to change the Albanians’\nattitudes towards Serbs, nor the Serbs’ attitude towards Albanians. On the\ncontrary, the situation has become more complicated. The integration attempts\non the Yugoslav ethnic identity basis, have negatively affected the ethnic\nconflict between Serbs and Albanians, and disregarded the Albanians situations\nand their demands before the formation of Yugoslavia in 1945, which in turn led\nto the lack of confidence by Albanians towards the ruling elite again, as such\nattempts did not effectively enhance the living conditions of Albanians, which\nled to social instability and ethnic tension. \u201cDuring this time, Kosovo\u2019s\nethnic Albanian populations gained an unprecedented level of influence as they\nwere included as minority representatives in Yugoslavia\u2019s federal government,\nand were protected under Serbian law. This peace however, did not last\u201d (Shan\n2014.p54).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      2.2 MY REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE TOPIC <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This research lay with my concerns about\nthe international ethnic sectarian conflicts, and for the importance of the\nfile of the conflict in Kosovo and Syria, which its disastrous affects reached\nthe neighboring countries in both the two countries and across the border in\nterms of the refugee crisis and security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      1. The\nimportance of dedicating the comparative approach to compare the conflict in\nSyria with Kosovo as the latter is a part of or the last existing model based\non socialist ideology on the borders of Eastern Europe, which should have been\ntaken into account as one of the lessons learned for many Arab countries that\nadopt this ideology. There is a similarity between the regime of the Yugoslav –\nand Syria’ regime which fits the comparative approach. <\/li>
      2. The\nimportance of highlighting the similar reasons for the development of the\nconflict in both region Syria -Kosovo, as the model of nationalist state based\non ethnic and sectarian tendencies has failed at the time when the Serbian\nminority was governing Kosovo and Alawite regime in Syria. <\/li>
      3. The\nimportance of the both countries in the international balance of power, as they\ndid not hesitate to speed up to protect their interests in the light of the\nrigorous competition resulting from the importance of those countries on the\nmap for Russia, America and European countries.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

        2.3\nRESEARCH IMPORTANCE <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

        1. The\nlargest displacement of Syrian refugees after the Second World War, where the\nnumber of refugees reached about 5 million refugees distributed across the\nworld (msf.org 1999).<\/li>
        2. Likewise,\nbut not as the extent that Syria reached, due to the difference in the number\nof population between the both countries, the number of refugees in Kosovo\nreached 60,000 refugees distributed in different countries.<\/li>
        3. The emergence of the Islamic state\nduring the Syrian crisis and the intervention of the international coalition\nled by the United States of America that intervened in Syria militarily for the\nfirst time since the crisis.<\/li>
        4. The\ndifferentiation in the international power reaction towards the both issues, at\nthe same time, NATO has intervened to end the genocides practiced against the\nAlbanian in Kosovo, as it applied for the first time in the history, the theory\nof humanitarian intervention as the criteria of implementing this theory, but\nit did nothing towards the Syria’s conflict despite many humanitarian crimes\nand genocide made in it. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

          2.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          What is the role of the regime in the period of President Tito and Hafez\nAl-Assad in the conflict that the two countries suffer from?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          What role did Hafez Al-Assad and Tito play during their ruling terms in\npostponing this conflict?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          2.5 HYPOTHESIS <\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Tito and Hafez Al-Assad’s security, economic and demographic policies\nhave fueled the current conflict in Kosovo. <\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          2.6 THE RESEARCH LIMIT <\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The reign in which Hafez Al Assad and\nTito were in power, as we cannot neglect the coups period that Syria seen and\nthe role of the ruling regime and the policies of the presidents that governed\nSyria, besides the period in which Kosovo was under the control of Yugoslav\nFederation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          2.7 METHODS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          2.7.1 Comparative Approach<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

          1. The comparison between the\nconflict in Kosovo and the conflict in Syria, and in particular the cumulative\nand distant causes pertaining to the regime and the policies of the presidents\nwithin the scope of research and the development of the conflict by this way.\nAlthough the demands of the Albanian majority in Kosovo eventually evolved to\ncall for the independence of Kosovo form Yugoslav Federation in order to\nguarantee its right in the territory that affected by the aggressive policies\nof the Serbs, while the demands of Syrian ‘people is to the change the regime\nbecause of the policies and form of government, but the reasons of the conflict\nin both countries could met, even nearly match in many points, such as ideology\nand the idea of one-party , the use of the security solution to stabilize the\nregimes, and the marginalization and oppression of minorities.<\/li>
          2. Accordingly, if the ethnic\nAlbanians in Kosovo was a victim of political regimes, the Syrian people of all\nits ethnic and components are also a victim of the policies and regimes that\nadopt one ideology similar to the territory. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

            2.7.2 Historical and Descriptive Method<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

            1. The historical through reviewing\nthe historical events led to the strengthen of the ethnic and sectarian\nconflict in Syria and the territory of Kosovo, which was referred to in the\nmost studies, research and media reports as the reasons for the success and\nstability, especially at the period of President Tito and Assad, but even more\nso, there is a highly promotion for those models as one of the most successful\nmodel.<\/li>
            2. Descriptive: describing and the\nvariables that the both countries experienced from their regimes and the\ninteractive of the ethnic units with them. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

              2.7.3\nAnalytical Approach<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Analyzing\nthe polices of the ruling elite that ruled both of Syria and Kosovo, that was\ngood at playing on ethnic and sectarian tendencies, and their role in fueling\nthe conflict among the component segments of the people simply by the absence\nof the security solution tied with certain person like Tito or Hafez Assad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              3. CONFLICT IN KOSOVO<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              3.1 THE ROOT OF SERBIAN-ALBANIAN\nCONFLICT <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              In fact, Kosovo has echoed strongly in\nthe heart and the conscience of the Serbian national history, wherein the\nSerbian legendary hero \u201cLazar\u201d was defeated by Ottomans in the historic battle\nof Kosovo in 1389 AD. This defeat is considered the beginning of the end to the\nSerbian nation in the medieval centuries, that is because it remained for five\ncenturies under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the\nSerbs hold a painful memory towards this region as they consider it as the\nbirthplace of the Serbian nation. \u201cKosovo is a holy place for Serbs as much as\nJerusalem is a holy place for Jews\u201d according to \u201cWarren Zimmermann\u201d (1995, p.1).\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              It should not be forgotten that\nAlbanians have fought side by side with Serbian against the Ottoman conquest\nespecially in the battle of Kosovo, because at that time, the Albanians were\nbelonging to the Christian religion, and they converted to Islam during the\nOttoman rule. Each party in the conflict does not recognize the thoughts and\nviewpoints of the other party, and each party either strongly feel that his\nopinion is the proper opinion. The ethnic Albanian group enjoyed a multiple\nbenefits during the Ottoman rule. When Ottoman Empire defeated in Balkan war,\nYugoslavia state has established and Kosovo has been integrated into Yugoslavia\nor occupied by the Serbs in 1912, since then Serbs became in distinctive\nstanding compared Kosovo Albanians. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              For many centuries, the territory of\nKosovo has constituted the source of conflict between Albanian and Serbs,\nKosovo’s issue surfaced again after the compliance of Ottoman Empire in the\nFirst Balkan war in 1912, for this reason \u201cLondon\u201d conference has been held to\narrange the situations, and to divide the Kosovo-populated areas. Albania state\nhas formed from one part of these areas (the newly formed state), while the\nother part remained in Kosovo and Macedonia, so they had to live in Serbia,\nbased on the fact that the territory of Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Subsequently, the constitution of 1974\ngranted Kosovo \u201cautonomy\u201d or (semi-state), the only thing that Albanians\nbenefited was to strengthen its ties with the neighboring Albania, especially\nafter the high pressure made by Albanians against the Serb minority, and the\nextreme poverty that the territory suffered at that time, besides the cessation\nof \u201creserbainazation\u201d procedures, all these factors led to the massive\nmigration of Serbian population as a result of the discriminatory actions and\nthe feeling of being threatened in this territory. For these reasons, more than\n160,000 Serbian left the territory between 1961 and 1986, at that same time\nthere was a growing increase in the number of the Albanians population in the\nterritory (M. Khalilzad 1993, p:56). Accordingly, the number of Serbs living in\nKosovo was about 170.000 in 1948, while in1986 the number of Serbs in Kosovo\nbecame about150,000 . As for Albanians, they increased from 500,000 to 1.700.000\nin 1999. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The geographical and geopolitical\nimportance of Kosovo stemmed from the fact that it is located in the southern\npart of the former Yugoslavia, at the same time the southern part of Republic\nof Serbia is located there; it also has common borders with Serbia, Montenegro,\nthe Republic of Albania and Republic of Macedonia. The Territory has a total\narea of 11 square kilometers; this area represents only 4.26% of the total area\nof Yugoslavia state. Although this geographic area is relatively small, it is\nconsidered the source of historic conflicts which extended up to the Year 2000\nbetween the ethnic Serbian group and the Albanians ethnic group. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Figure 3.1: Map of Kosovo<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

              Resource:<\/em> <\/em>http:\/\/legacy.lib.utexas.edu\/maps\/kosovo.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Albanians call it Kosova or Kosove,\nwhile Serbs insisting on the name of Kosovo and Mitohija altogether or the\nabbreviation kosmet (Arnaout\n1997.p18), but the former American president used the term Kosovar\non the people living in Kosovo whether they are Albanians or Serbian, and the\nterm Kosovo most commonly in English and French language. Hence, we could find\nsome authors using both terms Kosovo and Kosova respectively, so each party in\nthis conflict insists on his own name for the Territory, which represents\nevidence that each party herein remains committed to his historic demands \u201cknown\nas Southern Serbia in Serbia, and Eastern Albania in Albania\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Economically, Kosovo is rich in natural\nresources as it contains 50% of the nickel reserves existing in Yugoslavia, 48%\nof zinc and lead, and 47% of the magnesium existing in Yugoslavia (M.Vickers 1998.p318).\nIn spite of all these natural resources existing in the Territory of Kosovo, it\nremained one of the poorest regions in Yugoslavia and less developed than other\nYugoslav republics. In this regard, the Territory is considered as one of the\npoorest regions as it suffers from unemployment problems, the highest\nunemployment rate in Yugoslavia is found in Kosovo, where its unemployment rate\nrepresents two and a half times the general Yugoslav rate, and 70% of young\npeople between the age of 20 and 25 are unemployed. Between 1970 and 1982, the\nunemployment rate has increased from 76% to 77.6%, while unemployment in the\nSerb ethnic group declined from 17.6% to 15.1% and the following table shows\nthe unemployment rate between the Serbian ethnic group and the Albanians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Table 3.1: Serbians and Albanians ethnic group<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \n Year<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1948<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1953<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1961<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1971<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1981<\/strong>\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Albanians\n <\/td>\n 68,5\n <\/td>\n 64,9\n <\/td>\n 67,2\n <\/td>\n 73,7\n <\/td>\n 77,4\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Serbs\n <\/td>\n 23,6\n <\/td>\n 23,5\n <\/td>\n 23,6\n <\/td>\n 18,4\n <\/td>\n %13,4\n <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

              Resource:<\/em>\n<\/em>Momcilo Pavovic,Kosovo Under Autonomy\n1974-1990<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              These statistics shows that, although\nSerbs have a relatively small number of people in Kosovo, but the unemployment\nrate has declined while it has increased among Albanians. Demographically, this\nfactor has played a key role in fueling ethnic rivalry between the two groups,\nand the most important points in the dispute are the higher percentage of\nAlbanian population compared with Serbian population that witnessed a major\ndecline. It is notable that, the low number of Serbs does not mean the lack of\ninfluence to Serbs over the Territory. The situation in Syria is similar to\nKosovo, Alawite group like Kosovo Serb minority; both of them take control of\nall political, economic, and military institutions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              3.2 THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF\nTHE POPULATION <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    IN KOSOVO <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The Territory of Kosovo has multiple\nethnic groups, the ethnic conflict is not with the other ethnic groups living\nin the Territory, but the conflict is limited between Serbs and Albanian. The\nfollowing table shows the numbers of the population and the nationalities that\nlive in Kosovo, although there are more than 8 nationalities, the most\nimportant conflict is between Serbs and Albanians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Table 3.2: The number of population\nand nationalities<\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

              \n Percentage and Year\n <\/td>\n %\n <\/td>\n 1948\n <\/td>\n %\n <\/td>\n 1953\n <\/td>\n %\n <\/td>\n 1961\n <\/td>\n %\n <\/td>\n 1971\n <\/td>\n %<\/strong>\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Total\n <\/td>\n 727,830\n <\/td>\n 808,830\n <\/td>\n 963,988\n <\/td>\n 1,243,693\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Albanians<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 6,8\n <\/td>\n 498,2
              \n 42\n <\/td>              		\n 46.9\n <\/td>\n 524559\n <\/td>\n 67.2\n <\/td>\n 646,80
              \n 0\n <\/td>              		\n 73,7\n <\/td>\n 9168,16\n <\/td>\n 77.4\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Serbs<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 2,3\n <\/td>\n 171,9
              \n 91\n <\/td>              		\n 23.5\n <\/td>\n 189869\n <\/td>\n 23.6\n <\/td>\n 227,01
              \n 6\n <\/td>              		\n 18,4\n <\/td>\n 218,24\n <\/td>\n 13.2\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Montenegro<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 3,9\n <\/td>\n 2805\n <\/td>\n 3.9\n <\/td>\n 31343\n <\/td>\n 3.9\n <\/td>\n 37,588\n <\/td>\n 2.5\n <\/td>\n 31.555\n <\/td>\n 1.7\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Muslims<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1,3\n <\/td>\n 967,9\n <\/td>\n 0.8\n <\/td>\n 6241\n <\/td>\n 0.8\n <\/td>\n 8266\n <\/td>\n 2.1\n <\/td>\n 26.357\n <\/td>\n 3.7\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Romanian<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1,5\n <\/td>\n 1123\n <\/td>\n 1.5\n <\/td>\n 11904\n <\/td>\n 0.3\n <\/td>\n 3203\n <\/td>\n 1.8\n <\/td>\n 14593\n <\/td>\n 2.2\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Turkish<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 0,2\n <\/td>\n 1315\n <\/td>\n 4.3\n <\/td>\n 34585\n <\/td>\n 2.7\n <\/td>\n 25787\n <\/td>\n 1\n <\/td>\n 12.244\n <\/td>\n 0.8\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Yugoslav<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n –\n <\/td>\n –\n <\/td>\n –\n <\/td>\n –\n <\/td>\n 0.5\n <\/td>\n 5206\n <\/td>\n 0.1\n <\/td>\n 920\n <\/td>\n 02\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Croats<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 0,7\n <\/td>\n 5200\n <\/td>\n 0.8\n <\/td>\n 6203\n <\/td>\n 0.8\n <\/td>\n 7251\n <\/td>\n 0.7\n <\/td>\n 8264\n <\/td>\n 0.6\n <\/td><\/tr>
              \n Others\n <\/td>\n 0,3\n <\/td>\n 2103\n <\/td>\n 0.3\n <\/td>\n 3541\n <\/td>\n 0.2\n <\/td>\n 3110\n <\/td>\n 0.3\n <\/td>\n 5328\n <\/td>\n 0.2\n <\/td><\/tr>
              <\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

              Resource<\/em>:\nMomcilo Pavlovic,op.cit.p.5
              \n
              \n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

              The above statics shows that there is a\ndecline in the number of Serbs Population living in Kosovo, especially in 1961\nas it continued to decline until the end of 1981. The percentage of Serbian\npopulation has declined from 23.6% to 13.2% respectively. in other words, the\npercentage of Albanians population has increased in that period from 76.2 to\n73.4 to 74.4. This statics also indicates that the demographic growth tends to\nbe in favor of Albanians ethnic group. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              Referring to historical contexts which\nKosovo has gone through, the demographic change in Albanian and Serbs\npopulation can be attributed to the following reasons: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

              1. The political, social, and\neconomic situation, whereas the migration movements of Albanians and Serbian\npeople affected by the situations mentioned above. <\/li>
              2. The policies of political elites\nthat ruled Kosovo, played considerably on the nationalist sentiment for both\nethnic groups to implement its agenda and to stabilize itself in the rule. <\/li>
              3. The regional and international\nsituation, there has been a significant increase in Serbs numbers due to the\ninternational and regional position at that time. On the contrary, Italians and\nGermans granted many advantages for Albanians that led to the demographic\nchange in favor Albanians. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                For instance, in 1966 during the rule of\nthe leader Tito, as that year was a turning point in the Albanians lives,\nbefore that date the repressive policies made by Serbs has been condoned, which\nled to many abuses against Albanian in Kosovo. After that date, Albanian has\nbeen granted many political and economic advantages that affected the\ndemographic situation in favor of Albanian. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                From the Serbian point of view, there\nwas abnormal increase in the population, as they attributed that increase to\nthe immigration of Albanians from the Republic of Albania to Kosovo, however;\nAlbanians rejected these claims. The migration issue became one of the most\nimportant political issues that the Serbs has exploited, as they maintained\ntheir previous position, that the migration is a predominantly political issue\nwhose objective was to purge Kosovo from Serbian ethnic group by Albanian.\nHowever, the Albanians confirmed that the economic factor was the main reason\nfor the immigration of both Serbs and Albanians, and the Albanians group has\nleft Kosovo to European countries for employment opportunities as a result of\nthe unemployment and poverty that hit the Territory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Albanians refuted the Serbian claims and\nrelied on the historical sources in particular the genocides made by Serbs\nagainst the people of Kosovo for instance \u201cduring the period between 1912 and\n1941\u201d wherein at least 300 Albanians have been evicted. In this period, 14.000\nSerb families were settled in the Territory, in addition to; between 1918 and\n1938 the Serbs Army has burned and destroyed 320 villages inhabited by\nAlbanians and killed 12346 persons and captured 51.15 houses and burned 6125\nhouses (Z. Dasklovski 2007, p.5).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                The ethnic cleansing in Kosovo against\nAlbanians by Serbs has begun since the collapse of Ottoman Empire, and then the\nSerbs leadership has captured the Territory of Kosovo. According to Daily\nChronicle newspaper in the issue published on 12 November 1912: thousands of\nAlbanians had been subject to genocides by Serbs, 2000 Muslims also had been\nslaughtered in the capital of Macedonia besides 5,000 others slaughtered near\nthe city of Perzin and the Serbs openly declared that Albanian Muslims must be\nexterminated because they are the only way to restore peace in the country(R. Elsie 2008, p.8).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                From the Serbian point of view, there\nwas abnormal increase in the population, as they attributed that increase to\nthe migration of Albanians from the Republic of Albania to Kosovo, however;\nAlbanians rejected these claims. The migration issue became one of the most\nimportant political issues that the Serbs has exploited, as they maintained\ntheir previous position, that the migration is a predominantly political issue\nwhose objective was to purge Kosovo from Serbian ethnic group by Albanian (R. Elsie 2008, p.32). However,\nthe Albanian confirmed that the economic factor was the main reason for the\nimmigration of both Serbs and Albanians, and the Albanian group has left Kosovo\nto European countries for employment opportunities as a result of the\nunemployment and poverty that hit the Territory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Serbs used many means to displace\nAlbanians from Kosovo: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                1. Forced migration:<\/strong> The\nforced migration came after the Serbian oppression, as the Albanians suffered\nfrom many kinds of oppressive measures that make the Albanian\u2019s life\nimpossible, so they forced to leave their homes. <\/li>
                2. The measures utilized to encourage\nthe people to leave their homes: There was multiple means used by Yugoslav\nAuthorities to force the Albanians to leave their countries: For instance,\npeople were being threatened with death, Serbs also imposed a restriction on\nthe freedom in all spheres of life, prohibited teaching the Albanian language,\nand prevented the national sentiment to be expressed. <\/li>
                3. Migration for Albania Kosovo,\nAlbanians have been pressured to migrate to Albania and forced to be registered\nas a Turkish people within the statics regulations to facilitate their\nmigration to Turkey. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                  Serbian migration issue from Kosovo\nbegan to take a major priority for Serbian authorities whether in Kosovo or\nRepublic of Serbia, therefore; Serbian writers and intellectuals warned on the\npotential consequences resulting from cleaning Kosovo from Serbian people.\nSerbs have spread their propaganda due to the lack of neutral statics in\nparticular after Albanian’s boycott for the census of 1991, hence Serbs seized\nthe opportunity and conducted the one-sided census. Such statics show the\npercentage of Serbs and Montenegro that emigrated from Kosovo according to\nSerbs\u2019 claims(R. Elsie\n2008.p8).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Table 3.3:<\/strong> Emigration from\nKosovo (1948-1991)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n Year<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n 1948\n <\/td>\n 1961\n <\/td>\n 1971\n <\/td>\n 1981\n <\/td>\n 1991\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Total of population\n <\/td>\n 727,820\n <\/td>\n 936,188\n <\/td>\n 1,243,693\n <\/td>\n 1,584,558\n <\/td>\n 1,956,196\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Albanians\n <\/td>\n 68,4\n <\/td>\n 67,1\n <\/td>\n 73,7\n <\/td>\n 77,4\n <\/td>\n 81,59\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Serbs\n <\/td>\n 23,6\n <\/td>\n 23,6\n <\/td>\n 18,3\n <\/td>\n 13,2\n <\/td>\n 10,97\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Montenegro\n <\/td>\n 3,9\n <\/td>\n 2,5\n <\/td>\n 1,7\n <\/td>\n \/\n <\/td>\n 3.95\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n others\n <\/td>\n 4,1\n <\/td>\n 5,4\n <\/td>\n 5,5\n <\/td>\n 9,2\n <\/td>\n \/\n <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                  Resource<\/em>: Momcillo Pavlovic,op.cit.,p.27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  According to the above tables that\nindicate: the percentage of Albanian population has increased between 1948 and\n1991 from 68.4% to 81.59 an increase of 13.9%, while the percentage of Serbian\npopulation in the same period had declined from 23.6 to 10.97, an decline of\n12.63. The aforesaid percentages mean that half population of Serbs left\nKosovo. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Figure\n3.2: Ethnic composition of Kosovo 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                  Resource<\/em>:https:\/\/www.fuen.org\/fr\/actualites\/single\/article\/historical-compromise-between-serbia-and-kosovo-trust-cannot-be-ordered-by-treaty\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The policies of the ethnic Serbs groups\nfrom long ago, were to evict non-Serbs minorities such as Roma, Hungarian, and\nAlbanian from both of Serbia and Kosovo. To clarify this policy we are cite the\nnote published on 3rd of November 1944 by the Serbian writer Vaso Cubrilovic\nwhich calling for the capture of the Backa Territory \u201cif we desired to settle\nour problems with minorities we should occupy the Backa Territory and Kosovo,\nbesides evicting hundreds of Hungarian and Albanian, and it is necessary\ncleansing the Germans and Hungarians from Ancient Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia\n(Atanassova 1999.p2)\nHence migration is an alibi they hide behind. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Serbian ethnic group is distributed in\nmany republics: Croatia, Montenegro,Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nRepublic of Serbia, and the Albanian ethnic Group is also distributed in\nSeveral republics and European countries, and the highest proportion of\nAlbanians existing in the Republic of Albania and then Kosovo, Macedonia, and\nthe following table shows us the distribution of the Albanian population. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Table 3.4: The distribution of the Albanian\npopulation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n Country\n <\/td>\n Census \n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Albania \n <\/td>\n 3,080,000\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Kosovo \n <\/td>\n 1,800,000\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Macedonia \n <\/td>\n 443,000\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Italy\n <\/td>\n 100,000\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Greece \n <\/td>\n 50,00\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Serbia \n <\/td>\n 80,000\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Montenegro\n <\/td>\n 37,00\n <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                  Resource<\/em>: Atanassova,The impact of Ethnic Issues on Security of East Europe<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  On\nthe other hand, religion has played a major role in the outbreak of conflicts\nin the Balkan, especially among Muslims, Albanian Catholics and Serbian\nOrthodox. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Table 3.5: The religious structure in Kosovo <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n Muslims\n <\/td>\n 1.7 million Muslims \n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Roman Catholics\n <\/td>\n 60.000\n <\/td><\/tr>
                  \n Orthodox Serbs\n <\/td>\n 190.000 \n <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                  Resource<\/em>:\nDenitch, 1994, p.113.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Serbs belong to the Serbian Orthodox\nChurch and non-Serbs embrace the religion of Islam, Catholics. And there is an\nAlbanian minority belongs to the Orthodox Church, Serbs is considered Kosovo as\nthe holy place of the Serbs because it is the birthplace of the Serbian\nOrthodox Church. The most of Serbian Orthodox churches located in Kosovo as it\nthe region wherein most of the monuments relating to Serbian culture in\nmedieval centuries. It is the place of the historic battle that witnessed the\ncollapse of the Serbian empire in medieval centuries by the Ottoman Empire\nwhich ruled the middle region for more than five centuries(Arnaout 1999.p60).\n<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3.3 THE ARRIVAL OF JOSIP TITO TO\nPOWER <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Tito joined the Communist Party of\nYugoslavia (CPY), and was an effective member in the party before his detention\nin 1929. He has released from prison in 1934, and has quickly became a\nprominent member in (CPY), then he named himself Tito, which it was an alias\nname and used that name to work in secret. He went to the Soviet Union to work\nwith the Soviet-led international communist organization – and in 1937-1938\nescaped from the purge of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to senior leaders of the\nCommunist Party. In 1939, Tito became Secretary-General of the Communist Party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  In 1941, Axis forces invaded and\noccupied Yugoslavia, and Tito and his Communist Party emerged as leaders of the\nanti-Nazi resistance. In 1944, Soviet forces liberated Yugoslavia, and in March\n1945 Marshal Tito was appointed as head of the new federal government of Yugoslavia.\nNon-Communists were fully evicted from the government, and in November 1945\nTito was elected as a Yugoslav prime minister in elections limited to\ncandidates from the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front. In the same\nmonth (History.com.1999)[3]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  the second Yugoslavia was established on\nthe ruins of the Second World War, which was called Yugoslavia Tito 1945-1980,\nwhich included Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nMontenegro, and two the autonomous regions of Kosovo, and he encouraged Serb\nmigrations to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Kosovo Territory, which\nadministratively annexed to Serbia, as well as migrating to Macedonia, he tried\nto create human balances that contribute to the stability of his regime. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Albanians was granted autonomy over\nKosovo under the 1963 Constitution which paved the way for Kosovo to be\nrepresented within the Yugoslav Federal Parliament under the 1974\nconstitutional amendments, which eased the ethnic conflict between Albanians\nand Serbs, and curbed the Soviet-Serbian nationalism\u2019s ambition to control\nKosovo. Some media studies and institutions, as mentioned earlier, referred the\nstability of Kosovo under President Tito thanks to a series of security\npolicies that had only a role to complicate and deepen the conflict between\nSerbs and Albanians, these policies imposed a phase of false social and\ncultural stability between the two main components of the region, and led to\nthe postponement of the conflict as evidenced by its appearance on the surface\nas soon as his death in 1980.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  \n\nAfter the formation of \u201cGreater Albania\u201d, as part of\nthe Italian Empire, which included most of Kosovo and other areas inhabited by\nAlbanians (Western Macedonia and southern Montenegro), where Albanians received\nmany cultural, economic and commercial advantages, at the same time, Tito and a\ngroup of his colleagues were being established the Communist Party of\nYugoslavia (Britannica.2019). The party called for the building of a new\nYugoslavia based on the equality among the community of Yugoslav nationalities,\nand induced Albanians to establish Communist Party of Albania. The party also\nprovided messages of support for Kosovo Albanians to exercise their right to\nself-determination. \n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  In this context, Albanians formed a council\nrepresenting all the people to voice their interests and destiny. In 1944, the\nfounding conference of Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation held in\nKosovo, and released its historic statement that provides \u201cThe Territory of\nKosovo is inhabited by the majority of Albanian people that desire to unite\nwith Albania, accordingly; the path in which the Albanian people take shall be\nclarified for purpose of achieving this ambition: In addition to: the joint war\nwith Yugoslavia people against the Nazi occupier (Arnaout.1999)\u201d\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  However, some Kosovo units have defected\nafter the liberation of Kosovo, as they thought their mission has ended with\nthe conference’s decision that granted Kosovo Albanians the right to\nself-determination, The leadership of the Communist Party did not respond to\nthe decision at that time, as it considered the decision as a rebellion \u201ccounter-revolution\u201d.\nIn1945, the leadership of the Communist Party imposed the military\nadministration on Kosovo for the purpose of forcing them to continue fighting.\nSuch procedures were considered at that time as a coup against the \u201chistoric\ndecision\u201d that issued by the conference in which it stressed the right of\nAlbanians people to self-determination. The counter-revolution has been\neradicated, and the \u201cAnti-Fascist Council of National Liberation\u201d has been\nforced to declare the accession of Kosovo to the Republic of Serbia within the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time during February 1945, the\ndestiny of Kosovo was decided by Tito in the closed meetings that included the\nclose circle officials (Arnaout.1999.P68).<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3.4 THE ROLE OF HIS POLICIES IN\nSERBIAN-ALBANIA CONFLICT <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                         IN KOSOVO<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3.4.1 The Security Policy<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The Territory of Kosovo constituted one\nof the most important factors that has had a major impact on the dissolution of\nYugoslavia, which continues to be a factor of the instability of the entire\nregion of the Balkan, because the root causes of this problem are basically\nassociated with the formation of Albania state as an independent state after\nBalkan wars. The Territory of Kosovo is one of the regions located in\nYugoslavia, which had not attained the level of the Republic but remained\nautonomous before abolishing the autonomy by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989. As a\nconsequence, a wave of turmoil erupted in Kosovo and resulted in the death of\n10 Albanian demonstrators, however; these incidents were not the beginning\npoint in Kosovo crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  In spite of the impact resulting from\nthe abolition of the autonomy in 1989, which worsened the current conflict\nbetween Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo, there are a set of economic,\npolitical, and social factors remained effective thanks to the policies that\nTito pursued towards this crisis. Tito has taken a communist approach in his\npolitical journey, that meet with the Soviet ideology, and relied on secret\npolice group known as \u201cOzna\u201d to implement his policy in the country and to\neliminate his opponents as well. He did not pursue a reform policy that takes\ninto account the ethnic tension between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. On the\ncontrary, all solutions provided at that time, was based on deepening the\nhostility and hatred between the two conflicting parties. Whereas, the link\nbetween the Serbs and Albanians (Marxism) in their fight against the Italian\ninvasion during the Second World War turned into loyalty to ethnicity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Addressing the ethnic problems during\nTito reign was prohibited and punishable by the law that is because the\nConstitution stated that people in Yugoslavian have equal rights and duties. At\nall events, Tito’s policy has fueled the national strife and conflict, and at\nbest racial tension has been encircled and tackled only on the surface, through\nideological constraints, while social differences have evolved and intensified\nat the bottom. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                   Accordingly, The security agencies intensified\ntheir activities against Albanians in Kosovo simply for their loyalty to the\nAlbanian government on the other side of Yugoslav borders, Especially after the\ndeterioration of the relations between both countries, due to the support of\nAlbanian president Anwar Khouja, to the decision of Communist Information\nBureau of the Government of Stalin. Whereas the Communist Party of Yugoslavia\n(CPY) was accused of deviating from the principles of the Communist Party, the\neconomic, social strangulation increased on Yugoslavia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  As a result, the security agencies began\na large-scale campaign of arrests against Albanians in Kosovo instead of\ngaining them in their favor in the face of the blockade imposed by Stalin and\nthe neighboring countries, which might be reflected on the internal tense\nsituation as a result of the regional situation. In this regard, once a person\nis suspected of supporting Stalin’s decision, he is arrested without trial. the\nYugoslav agencies dealt with all the Albanians in Kosovo as third class\ncitizens, especially because they are stationed along the border with Albania (Arnaout 2008,\np.72). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  These oppressive practices extended even\nto the intellectual elite, that has not been immune from detention, unfair\ntrials, and execution as these procedures included the participants in Bojan\nconference 1\/1\/1944. The participants in the conference declared the desire of\nthe Albanian people to unite with Kosovo, for this reason, the Albanian prisoners\nwere accused of co-operation with the foreign conspiracies and treason, and\nthey also were accused of imposing the viewpoint of the security agencies and\nreturning Kosovo to the atmosphere of the former Serbian policies. Once a\nperson is calling for the unity with Yugoslavia, it considered a dangerous act\nthat entails charging him with treason. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  On the other hand, the policy of Tito\ntowards the conflicting parties is among the factors that reflected on the\nSerbs-Albanian conflict, as he played considerably on the principle of the\nhistoric conflicts among ethnic groups to impose a sort of stability that many\nstudies have described as the full \u201cstability.\u201d In this regard Tito said, \u201ca\nweak Serbia means a strong Yugoslavia, and a weak Yugoslavia means a weak\nSerbia\u201d These declarations strengthened ethnic oppression, so Tito sought to\nweaken the Serbian ethnic group that it is the biggest ethnic group in\nYugoslavia as it constitutes about 42% of the population according to the\ncensus of 1961 and 36% of the population according to the census of 1991(Dode1999.p11).<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3.4.2 The Demographic Change<\/strong>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Tito attempted to promote the Yugoslav\nidentity through imposing it on the ethnic components of the state by using the\nsecurity legislation and the policies. In the context of the conflict between\nSerbs and Albanians, these measures have highly increased the Albanian ambition\nto live within the space of the union that is histrionically full of ethnic\nstrife between Albanians and Serbs without providing a real solution to solve\nthe real causes of the problem that its roots back to the Ottoman rule of\nBalkan states. This policies were not separated from the Albanians\u2019 mental\nimage towards many Serbs nor the abuses they incurred by Serbs during Yugoslav\nCivil war in 1941-1945, as they were subject to \u201creserbainzation\u201d of the\ncommunity and its local institution, together with the massive displacement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  These policies have spread to hit the\neconomic, educational, and social system in Kosovo through dismissing many\nteachers, employees off their jobs on the pretext of their supporting to the\nAlbanian Government. A new wave of Serbian settlers had systematically migrated\nto Kosovo on the basis of covering the existing shortage in educational and\neconomic cadres etc… In this context, teachers and intellectuals put under\npressure, as the Albanian language has been prohibited, and there was no\nexpansion in education for the purpose of employing Serbian cadres and experts\nthroughout the country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Serbian authority forced Albanian to\ndeclare that they are \u201cTurkish\u201d in the census of 1953, to facilitate the scheme\nthat aimed at resolving Albanian matter of Kosovo by emptying the Territory of\nthe Albanian component. As a result of these pressures, the number of Turks in\nKosovo increased from 1,350 in 1948 to 34,583 in the 1953 census. This scheme\nfacilitated the large-scale emigration for Turkey, as the continual pressures\npushed thousands of Albanian to emigrate during the 1950s. In 1953 only, 13,000\nTurks emigrated while 17,000 Turks emigrated in 1954(Arnaout 2008.p73).\nBy the year 1956, these pressures extended to what was known as \u201ccarrying Arms\u201d,\nthe agencies launched a series of raids and arrested dozens of thousands to\ninvestigate them for purpose of obtaining information about weapons. The\ncampaign was the worst memory for decades in the hearts of Albanians and had a\nmajor role in driving tens of thousands to migrate to Turkey. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  These policies remained associated with\nthe conflict between Serbs and Albanians, as emigration issue was being dealt\naccording to the political situation in Kosovo, and the number of both\ncomponents to the Territory (Serbs and Albanians) was being increased and\ndeclined according to the policies pursued. In 1966, Kosovo has granted\nautonomy in accordance with a package of constitutional reforms enabled\nAlbanian Kosovo to be represented in the Communist Party; as a consequence\nthere was further involvement in Yugoslav local administration (ausa.org 1999, p.5).\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  These reforms did not take into account\nthe other side – Serbs – who consider themselves a victim of ethnic injustice\nlike Albanians. These reforms came as a temporary solution to impose a false\nbalance of \u201cbrotherhood\u201d that Tito called for, rather than an integrated plan\nto address the root causes of the ethnic conflict. These reforms have raised\nthe concerns of Serbs who constructed what happened in 1966 similar to what\nhappened In 1389 that they consider it another big loss for Kosovo and another\ndefeat to Serbs, in particular, the tension was being increased with the\napproach of the 600th<\/sup> anniversary to the battle of Kosovo 1389 (Arnaout 2008, p.79).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Tito has conducted the demographic\nchange for the purpose of curbing the Serbian dream that was intended to put\nKosovo under Serbian control, and he has given Albanian Kosovo many\nconstitutional advantages that were in the Albanian interest in general. In the\nother side, he facilitated the \u201creserbainzation\u201d process to many Albanian\ninstitutions in Kosovo through facilitating the emigration of a significant\nnumber of Serbs. As a result of these policies – even we supposed they were\nwell-intended, but the real intention was to stabilize the rule of Tito through\nplaying considerably on the demographic composition of Kosovo. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3.4.3 The Economic Policies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Yugoslavia’s experience in handling\ndifferent kinds of ethnic groups proved the contrary, as the ethnic spirit is\nstrongly rooted in the lives of the people, so melting these sentiments into\nthe crucible of modern state failed even at the economic level, however; these\nproblems have reflected on the federal regime that suffered from all factor of\ndivision and dispersion. Tito’s experience showed social and economic\ndifferences between the developed north and the underdevelopment south which\nmeans the minority-rich in the north and the majority-poor in the south, and\nupon the death of Tito in 1980, the nationalism replaced the empty that left by\nthe communist regime then the ethnic strife and sectarian intolerance have\nincreased. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Although Kosovo is rich with mineral\nresources, its economy highly depending on agriculture as 68% of its land is\nsuitable for cultivation. It suffers from a severe shortage of energy sectors\nand roads, and most of the industries are operational industries in addition, a\nsevere shortage of infrastructure and a lack of long-term investments that\ncould cover the existing deficit in the economy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  These economic circumstances were\naccompanied by a systematic eviction of Albanian workers especially in 1966.\nThis issue as mentioned above contributed to evicting Albanians from the state\ninstitutions (education, economy, police, etc\u2026) which had a clear economic\nimpact on the unemployment rate. Tito has pursued a different kind of economic\npolicy to deal with poor regions as he relied on Blood Transfusion (S.Shan\n2015.p55).This means strengthening the economy of the poor regions depending on\nrich countries such as Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Croatia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  As a result of this strategy, most of\nthe investment projects were targeting the rich countries, but he did not rely\non resources existing in Kosovo to establish a heavy industry. The industries\nbuilt was heavily dependent on the raw materials that were – available in\nadvance – in Kosovo with a low margin of profit. This in turn led to an unstable\neconomy in the union countries in general. On the other hand, the Federal Fund\nfor the Development of various regions of Yugoslavia was formed, and Kosovo has\na share of about two thirds of this fund (Arnaout\n2008, p.76). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                   The economic solutions did not pay attention\nto the ethnic situation, as a result, these policies only contributed to\nincreasing the social deterioration and worsen the living conditions of\nAlbanians, at the same time, the per capita income of the national income was\nin Kosovo $ 800 was $ 5,000 in Slovenia. The situation did not change much even\nafter the death of Tito, as at the beginning of 1990 the per capita income of\nthe national income was in Kosovo 1302$ compared with 12618$ in Slovenia (S.Shan\n2015, p.55). The difference moved from 5 to 10 doubles. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  This policy contributed to deepening the\nethnic disputes among the countries and the territory of the union. As the rich\ncountries saw that these policies draining its local economy. Rich countries\nhave begun to refuse to participate and sacrifice for the sake of building\nKosovo’s economy. This is one of the reasons that led Slovenia to secede from\nthe Union in 1990. On the other hand, in the poor areas such as Kosovo,\nAlbanians felt they had been exploited to concentrate most of the investments\nin countries such as Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia. Most industries in Kosovo\nwere operational industries and were not upgraded to be heavy industries or to\nbe real infrastructure projects that would reduce high unemployment rates, rather\nthan relying on ready-made financing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The economic situation has reflected on\nthe ethnic tension between Serbs and Albanians, each party a range of\ngrievances to mistrust on the other party, so the economic policy depended on\nshort-term solutions, but there will no investment in infrastructures and basic\nindustries that pave the way to sustainable economic renaissance consistent\nwith the living conditions in Kosovo and enhance the relations between Serbs\nand Albanians. Albanians felt inequality due to the distribution of industries\nand investment on a regional basis, which widened the gap and strengthened the\nconflict between the Albanians and the rest of the peoples of the Union,\nparticularly with the Serbs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  3.5 CONSEQUENCES <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  This conflict evolved into a war between\nthe Yugoslav and NATO forces. The territory of Kosovo was separated from\nBelgrade that no longer has any political authority or sovereignty over the\nterritory, the Territory has become under United Nations administration that\nprotects it from any internal and external threat, Kosovo is the last territory\nto escape from Serbian control, Belgrade lost Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and\nMontenegro. Montenegro held a referendum for self-determination and more than\n50 percent expressed their desire for independence. It no longer bears the name\nof the Republic of Yugoslavia and Montenegro after the emergence of the\nRepublic of Montenegro. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  Kosovo crisis established the\ninternational basics and criteria for humanitarian intervention, which involved\na media furor and academic controversy between international lawyers and\ndiplomats, as a result of NATO intervention without Security Council\nauthorization especially over the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the\nintervention and its relationship to the ethnic cleansing. . For the purpose of\navoiding a humanitarian disaster in the Territory, the crisis entailed the\nintervention without Security Council authorization for fear of the use of Veto\nby Russia. On the contrary, the Security Council did not intervene in Syria\ncrisis due to Russian and Chinese Veto. An international committee has been\ndeveloped to set a criteria for the humanitarian intervention and submitted its\nreport to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  At the same time, the Albanian people\nresolutely refused to back to the autonomy that was applied before 1989, which\nmean the return to the oppressive Serb’s rule that evicted and persecuted\nAlbanians. It is difficult for Albanians to accept any Serbian soldier in their\nland because this will provoke the feelings and emotions of the Albanians<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  The losses in each\nSyria and Kosovo as a result of this conflict are limited to: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                  1. The\nfull destruction of economic infrastructure in Syria and Kosovo such as:\ntransportation, bridges, fuel depots, plants, power stations, and civil and\nmilitary airports. The material losses estimated at billions of dollars. Which\nrequires a long time to recovery the economy, provided that providing a local\nand international funds.<\/li>
                  2.  On the humanitarian side: the problem of refugees\nhas emerged as a result of the repression and genocides in both countries,\nwhich considered as the biggest population movement that Europe has seen since\nthe Second World War. This problem affects the neighboring countries in both\ncountries for securing housing and feeding those refugees.<\/li>
                  3. The\ninternational organizations have intervened in Kosovo under the administration\nof the United Nation, which led to the collapse of the power and authority of\nSerbian leader Milosevic as a result of the military defeat, besides removing\nhis power and prosecuting him at the International Tribunal against war crimes\ncommitted by him. In Syria, the head of the regime has lost all influence over\nall regions and Governorates. Moreover; his movement became conditioned by the\ninterests of the countries that supporting him, which has taken the control of\nmost of the Syrian territory <\/li>
                  4. The\ncontinuation of the tension between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Even after\nthe entry of multinational forces, that led to the United Nations\nadministration over the Territory. In Syria, although there were many\ninternational agreements and the truces signed, but the tension continued. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                    4.\nCONFLICT IN SYRIA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    4.1 THE ROOT OF THE CONFLICT IN\nSYRIA <\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Syria was vulnerable to\nmigrations of the peoples of the neighboring regions, which were gathered\naround the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris since the third millennium BC. It\nwas a center of many communities as it was the cradle of many civilizations of\npeoples in the region, which was gathered around the banks of the Tigris and\nEuphrates. Whereas the region was in continuing tension due to the conflict\nbetween different civilizations on the banks of the two rivers, but the river\nNile was the center of only gathering civilizations in the Egyptian state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Syrians declared their\nindependence under the leadership of King Faisal I, son of Sharif Hussein. But\nBritain and France, the victors in the First World War, were planning to divide\nthe Arab regions. According to the Sykes-Picot Treaty in 1916, the two\ncountries agreed to divide the Middle East into the influence of British and\nFrench and agreed that Syria would be in the French influence zone. In the\nearly 1920 the French troops landed on the Syrian coast and after series of\nbattles with the Syrian army that was less in numbers and arms, The French\ntroops, after the sacrifices made by the warriors that fought the French,\nenabled to put Syria under its control, in 1923, the beginning of French\nmandate has been declared over Syria with authorization from United Nations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Geographically, Syria is located in west\nof Asia within the region that geopolitically known as the Middle East, and is\nbounded by Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan and Palestine to the\nsouth, and Lebanon and the Mediterranean to the west. Damascus is the capital\nof Syria that consists of fourteen governorates.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Figure\n4.1: Map of Syria <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                    Resource<\/em>: https:\/\/legacy.lib.utexas.edu\/maps\/middle_east_and_asia\/syria_rel-2007.jpg<\/a>\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Syrians decided to\nresist the new occupation. In 1925, Syrians declared (the Great Syrian\nRevolution) that led by Sultan Pasha al-Atrash (Druze from Jabal al-Arab\nlocated in the south of Syria) against the mandate. There were fierce battles\nbetween the revolutionaries and the French troops at Jabal al-Arab region and\naround Damascus, the French troops stroke the capital in retaliation for the\nassistance of its people, eventually; French troops succeeded to suppress the\nrevolution but it continued in its political form. In 1936, France agreed to\ngrant Syria partial independence and signed a treaty between the two countries\nthat provided Syria incomplete independence. However, France disavowed the\ntreaty quickly, and its forces remained on Syrian land and remained the de\nfacto ruler of the country. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    During the Second World\nWar, Syria became under the control of the French pro-German Vichy government,\nThe Syrian territory witnessed a fierce clash between Vichy government forces\nand the Free France forces and the British forces, these confrontations ended\nby capture of Syria by Allied forces in 1941, then a new phase of promises has\nbegun to grant Syria the complete independence that French disavows them again.\nSyrians resisted the occupation; on 29 May 1945, France responded brutally\nagain, as it stroke the Syrian Parliament Building in Damascus, which sparked\nfurther protests in Syria and the rest of Arab world, then the crisis was\nreferred to UN Security Council that demanded French troops to leave the\ncountry. On 17 April 1946, under increasing international pressure, the latest\nFrench troops  withdrew from Syria, and\nthat day, which marked the beginning of a new era, was declared a national\nholiday.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The United States of\nAmerica rejected the survival of British and French forces in the Middle East\nregion, in order to inherit the spoils of those Empires in particular in the\nMiddle East. The post-independence period was characterized by political\ninstability. In 1948, Israel was declared as a state above the ruin of\nPalestine (The United State of America and the former Soviet Union was among\nthe early countries that recognize Israel), accordingly, Syria was among the\nArab countries that sent its troops to Palestine in order to confront the\nemerging country Israel. Arabs forces defeated in the war. In July 1949, under\nthe rule of Hosni al-Za’im, Syria was the latest Arabian country that signed\nthe Armistice Agreement with Israel. This was only the beginning of the\nArab-Israeli conflict, which has continued thus far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    In 1949, Syria\nwitnessed the first military coup in the country led by Hosni al-Za’im. The\nBritish and Iraqis supported the coup but the leader rule lasted for only 139\ndays, after which he was overthrown by a coup led by Sami al-Hinnawi, who\nquickly was overthrown by Colonel Adib al-Shishakli. These coups have taken\nplace under the competition of the internal nationalist parties and their\nsponsors existing in Arab countries that sought to a leading role in the\nregion. (Egypt and Iraq that represent a socialist nationalist trend and Saudi\nArabia that represents the conservative trend in the Arab world). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Al Shishakli remained\nin power until 1945, then the increased popular opposition forced him to resign\nand to leave the country for Lebanon and then to Saudi Arabia. However, Syria\nsuffered from the political turmoil that also came from the foreign countries. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    While the relations\nbetween Syria and the Soviet Union developed in the mid-1950s, its relations\nwith the West began to worsen. Accordingly, Syria found itself in the maze of\nthe Cold War, at the resulting of the alliances and rallies in the Middle East.\nIn 1957, the dispute between Syria and its northern neighbor Turkey almost\nreached the point of military confrontation. The rapprochement between Syria\nand The Soviet Union reached an unprecedented level, but the disagreements with\nWest have increased, for this reason, Western threats were one of the factors\nthat pushed the Syrians to unite with Egypt in one state called the United Arab\nRepublic, which was declared on 22 February 1958.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Egyptian President\nGamal Abdel Nasser was appointed as president to the emerging state, and he\ndemanded the dissolution of all political parties in exchange for his approval\nto be the president. It was a terrible blow to all parties in Syria, including\nthe Ba’ath party. But the officers\nwho pushed for unity, namely the Baathists themselves, was counted for\npromotion, in response to  their\nassistance to Nasser. However, the opposite was the case. Most of the non-Sunni\nofficers were dismissed from the army’s leadership positions by Nasser, who\nkept them in marginal positions or kept them in Egypt away from direct\ninfluence, including Hafez al-Assad, who established with his colleagues\nMohammed Omran and Salah Gaded and others, the secret military committee of the\nBa’ath Party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The\nunity with Egypt did not remain for a long time, because of The dissolution of\nthe Syrian political parties was one of the reasons that led the Syrian army to\nleave the unity and declare the separation from the United Arab Republic on 28\nSeptember 1961. It should be noted that the coup against the unity led by Abdul\nKarim Nahlawi. On March 8, 1963, The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party \u2013 led another coup\nand later popularized it until it became known as the 8th March Revolution. The\nBa’ath Party ended the estrangement with Egypt and declared its intention to\nrestore the unity, but the negotiations in this regard failed. The disputes\nthat emerged inside Ba\u2019ath Party itself constituted an obstacle towards\nimplementing its development project in Syria, as the mid-1960s were marked by\nfurther political unrest, that led to a coup on 23 February 1966, which was\nfollowed by the arrest of officers of the leadership, such as the President of\nthe Republic Amin Hafiz. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Economically, Syria\nlocated in the trade route between the Mediterranean and the Gulf states.\n.Furthermore, it located between Jordan, the Arabian Gulf, Turkey, and Europe,\nand it was the route towards the waters of the Mediterranean and the European\nmarket. Syria relied heavily on the transit trade lines that pass from Beirut\nto Damascus to Saudi Arabia towards Saudi Arabia. Since 1945, Damascus\nmerchants class strengthened their commercial relations with Saudi Arabia. By\n1949, Oil Projects began to emerge, hence the importance of Syria as it\ngeographically connected with oil-rich countries without water barriers and it\nhas a Mediterranean coastline. The first project sponsored by British and extended\nfrom Mosul through Syrian territory towards the Mediterranean. The second is\nsponsored by the United States of America and extends from eastern Saudi Arabia\nacross Jordanian territory to Syria and then to the Mediterranean through\nLebanon (Wakim\n2013.p100). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    In spite of unity attempts between Egypt\nand Syria as a result of the emergence of unionist nationalist spirit during\nNasser rule, but this unity had no impact on unifying the geography of peoples\nwith one root, such as Syria and Lebanon or Syria and Iraq or Syria and Jordan.\nBa\u2019ath Party played considerably on the Sectarianism, nationalism, and\nstratification to stabilize its rule and to impose the national identity (the\nruling party) which its policy based on the repression, the marginalization and\nthe accusation of treason against the groups that refused state project. Since\nthen, Syria has never known the stability Up to the present. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Since the French\noccupation, the ruling elite is considered as a part of foreign mobilization\nthat has its own agendas as it sought to at least to strengthen the colonialist\npolicies in a way that would serve to stabilize its rule for as long as\npossible. Even political parties that established in Syria were heavily\ninfluenced by Western ideas. the Syrian Social Nationalist Party has been\nestablished by Antoun Saadeh whom influenced by the French thoughts to\nnationalism, while Baa\u2019th Party has been established by Michel Aflaq and Salah\nal-Din al-Bitar that influenced by German thoughts to Nationalism. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Syria and Kosovo, both\nof them suffered for a long time from long-term of conflict, and they were the\nscene of international and regional conflict, which in turn has also affected\nthe internal situation. The neighboring countries used the ethnic issue in\naddition to their affiliated allies inside Syria, even the political parties in\nSyria were a simulation of some Western and communist models. Even the regimes\ndid not take the advantage of the long period rule that both of Tito and Hafez\nal-Assad remained, to create economic, social, and political prosperity based\non the ethnic and sectarian diversity that serve the two countries for a long\ntime. On the contrary, as mentioned above, the problem of ethnicity was one of\nthe methods that used to overthrow the opponents and to stir up nationalist\nprojects that had received no acceptance from the people in Syria or Kosovo. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    4.2\nTHE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION <\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Syrian population of, tribes, and clans\nacross all Syrian borders, have a kinship relation through marriage as a result\nof the political, economic and wars that Syria has gone through, or through the\ncircumstances that the other countries seen which led a movement of emigration\nfrom and to Syria. Syrian society is an extension to the rest of the peoples of\nthe neighboring countries, that interacting with each other when either side of\nthe border is exposed to any political, social or economic changes. Some clans\nand families living in the Syrian territory are an extension to the clans and\nfamilies of Arabian, Kurdish, Syriac and Assyrian Christian origin from the\ndifferent sectarian existing in Mesopotamia or Iraq with its current borders.\nWhile other clans and families are belonging to Arabian, Kurdish and Syriac\nChristian origin of Anatolia. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Alawite communities exist along the\nSyrian coast, and they are an extension to Turkish Arab Alawites in the\nprovince of Kilkia or what is so-called Hatti region in Turkey nowadays. The\nsouthern of Syria is inhabited by Arabian Sunni families and Druze families as\nwell, that are considered an extension to the tribes that came from Arabian\nPeninsula and Jordan with its current borders. in addition to the major cities\nsuch as Damascus and Aleppo, are considered as a mixture of the indigenous\npeoples and the peoples that came to it as a result of its location that exists\nin vital trade line throughout the history.  Followed that the period in which the major\ncountries played a major role in dividing the region by Sykes-Picot Treaty and\naccording to their interests. Accordingly, Syria was divided by its natural\nborders, which included Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon into four\ncountries, Syria and Lebanon given to France, while Jordan and Palestine given\nEnglish occupation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Syria is characterized by great ethnic\nand religious diversity due to the fact that it is one of the most vital areas\nin ancient history. And one of the oldest lands where the human remains have\nbeen discovered that back to the prehistoric era, there are some people near\nDamascus in Maaloula speaking the Aramaic language that spoken by Jesus. .\nSyria was the land that the Prophet Abraham, the father of all prophets, passes\nthrough before the emergence of Jews’ religion five centuries ago, and it was a\nscene for the major confrontations that had not been interrupted among the old\nempires such as Phoenicians, Assyrians, Greeks, Persians, Romans, and Pharaoh<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The population of Syria is currently\nestimated at more than 23 million. According to the United Nations Annual\nDemographic Report of 2008, the population of Syria is distributed to the main\ngovernorates as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Table\n4.1: Syria top 20 cities by population <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    \n Name<\/strong>\n <\/td>\n Population<\/strong>\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Aleppo\n <\/td>\n 1,602,264\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Damascus\n <\/td>\n 1,569,394\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Homs\n <\/td>\n 775,404\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Hamah\n <\/td>\n 460,602\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Latakia\n <\/td>\n 340,181\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Deir ez-Zor\n <\/td>\n 242,565\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Ar Raqqah\n <\/td>\n 177,636\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Al Bab\n <\/td>\n 130,745\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Idlib\n <\/td>\n 128,840\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Douma\n <\/td>\n 111,864\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Manbij\n <\/td>\n 99,497\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Dar’a\n <\/td>\n 97,969\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n As Salamiyah\n <\/td>\n 94,887\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Tartouss\n <\/td>\n 89,457\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Ath Thawrah\n <\/td>\n 87,880\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Al Hasakah\n <\/td>\n 81,539\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Darayya\n <\/td>\n 71,596\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n I`zaz\n <\/td>\n 66,138\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n Jablah\n <\/td>\n 65,915\n <\/td><\/tr>
                    \n As Safirah\n <\/td>\n 63,708\n <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                    Resource:<\/em> World Population Prospects (2017 Revision)<\/a> – United\nNations population estimates and projections. http:\/\/worldpopulationreview.com\/countries\/syria-population\/<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Some studies indicate that there\nare about 20 million people of Syrian origin in the other countries of the\nworld, especially in the Americas, Europe, and Australia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Religious Distribution<\/em>\n<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Due to the internal migration movement,\nit is impossible to limit certain geographical area with a separate ethnic or\nreligious group, while it is possible to talk about a general Sunni majority\nconcentrated in the main governorates: Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Raqqa and\nDaraa. While Muslims of the Alawite sect, who follow the Jaafari Shi’ite\nsect, are concentrated in the villages of the Syrian coast and some interior\nareas and close to the interior areas. With regard to the Druze, the highest\ndensity are concentrated in the southern region of Al Gabal in the governorate\nAl Suweida, as well as there are more than 40.000 Druze in the occupied Golan\nHeights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    As for Christian, they are spread in all\nover the country, they concentrated in certain cities or in some entire\nvillages, with reference to the presence of various ethnic groups such as\nAssyrians, Chaldeans, Syriac, and Armenians While the Armenians are mainly\nconcentrated in Aleppo, Latakia, and Qamishli. With regard to Kurds, their\nnumber is estimated at more than one million Kurds and they are concentrated in\nthe north-east areas. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    It is noteworthy that, the Act\ngranting Syrian nationality, that issued on the beginning of April 2000 for the\nunregistered births, because of the census of Hasaka 1962, indicates that there\nan increase in the number of Kurds officially registered in the state register\nby 200,000. As for the Turkmen in Syria – they are Sunni Muslims – there are no\naccurate statistics, but some sources are estimated their number by 3% of the\ntotal population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    Turkmen are distributed in Syria between\nthe villages and the cities and the most important gatherings in Aleppo,\nDamascus, Lattakia and Homs in which there is a region called Bab al-Turkman.\nIn Damascus they are concentrated on Saruja district, that was named after\nTurkish Mamluk leader, Sarem al-Din Saruja. In Aleppo Turkmen are concentrated\non the northern villages of Aleppo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    The Syrian Turkmen divide into two\nparts:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                    1. Turkmen of the cities: Turkmen\namong the Syrian families whose their roots extend back to Turkic dynasties\nthat existed in Syria since the arrival of the Seljuks and then the Mamluks and\nthe Ottomans. Some of these Turkmen families were being worked as officials in\nthe Ottoman army during the Ottoman reign. Among those families: Qabbani family\n(Nizar Qabbani), Mardam Bak, and others. <\/li>
                    2. Turkmen of the villages: A mixture\nof Turkoman clans (their origins back to from Oghuz tribes) and all the\nTurkoman villages in Syria from Oghuz.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                      Figure\n4.2: Ethnic composition of Syria <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                      Resource:<\/em> Ethnic\nComposition. Each color represents an ethnic or religious group. (Michael Izady\n\/ The Gulf\/2000 Project at Columbia University)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Due to the absence of accurate\nstatistics on religious distribution, many studies refer to various statistics,\nincluding the 1985 census, which lists the proportions as follows: 76.1% Sunni\nMuslims, 11.5% Alawites, 3% Druze, 1% Isma’ilis, between 4.5% and 0.4% a\nTwelver Shia, but there are some researchers have strong doubts about the\naccuracy of these proportions as they believe that The proportion of Sunnis in\nSyria is not less than 80% and reaches 85% if the Sunnis Kurds added to them\nbesides 9% Alawites and 5% Christians many of whom emigrated abroad(Aljazeera\n2011 )[4]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      While The US State Department’s report\non religious freedoms states that the percentage of Sunni Muslims in Syria is\n77%, 10% Alawite, 3% Druze, Ismailis, and Twelfth Shi’a, and 8% of the\npopulation are Christians of belonging to different sectarians affiliated to\nthe Eastern Church. The Orthodox denomination is largely dominated on the\nChristian distribution, There is also a Yazidi minority in the Jabal Sinjar\nregion on the border with Iran. As for the Jews, most of them emigrated after\nthe late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad allowed them to leave the country in\nthe early nineties of the last century, and statistics indicate that the\nsurvivals are very few and do not exceed thousands in Aleppo and Damascus\nexclusively, and there are studies indicating that their number does not exceed\na few hundreds (Aljazeera 2011 ).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      There are multiple\nEthnic and sectarian groups in Kosovo and Syria as well, as those ethnic and\nsectarian groups extended along the borders of the neighboring countries such\nas Kosovo Albanians, even though the Albanians issue surfaced only due to the\nbrutal practices against them. In Syria, too, there were many ethnic problems,\nthe most prominent of which was the sectarian tensions between Sunnis and\nAlawites which was covered by Tito’s security policies and a kind of balance\nthat did not last long. The main objective of these balances are to stabilize\nthe ruling regime and the use of the minority or the majority in fighting any\ncomponent that could pose a danger to the ruling regime in Syria, for example\nKurds against Arabs or Alawites against Sunnis and vice versa. Just as the same\npolicies that applied to the situation between Serbs and Albania. \n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      4.3\nTHE ARRIVAL OF HAFEZ AL-ASSAD TO POWER <\/strong><\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Syria witnessed a political division or\nsubordination for two major Arab power, the first one called Baghdad Axis or\nFertile Crescent, and the second one is the Egypt-Saudi Arabia axis and behind\neach axis a foreign countries. The arrival or lack access to the power in Syria\nwas depending on the support of their allies. Politicians also contributed some\nway in the politicization of the military through attracting the officers in\nfavor of each party or axis. This military personnel, later became involved in\nthe appointment of the government and ministers, dissolve the parliament if\ntheir interests and positions are threatened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The Arab Socialist\nBa’ath Party \u2013 came to power in Syria through a military coup on 8th March\n1963, led by a five-year military committee. The party dismissed at least 700\nhigh-ranking opponent’s officers, it replaced them with officers of minorities,\nin particular, the Alawite minority, then another coup in 1966 followed the\nfirst one, in which the president Amin Hafez\u201d has been overthrown and the\nopponents had been evicted as well. The nationalist leadership has been\neradicated, and the coup liquidated the Sunni officers which led to growing\nrepresentation of the religious minority again. Hafez al-Assad was appointed as\ndefense minister, and his opponents has been liquidated even who assisted the\nBa\u2019ath Party. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      In 1967, the war\nerupted between Israel and (Egypt – Jordan – Syria)Israel had managed to occupy\nGaza, Sinai, Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Syrian army\ninvolvement to assist Egypt and Jordan in this war was weak. It has even been\nsaid that the Syrian participation in this war was one of the causes of the\nNakba and led to the huge material loss in the lives, equipment in addition to\nthe new territories that seized by Israel, as the Minister of Defense (Hafez\nal-Assad) reported the fall of Quneitra three hours before occupying it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The disagreements began\nto emerge among the coup partners Salah Gaded (Assistant Secretary of the Arab\nBa\u2019ath Party) and Hafez Al-Assad (Minister of Defense)..Such disagreements\nreached its peak when Hafez Al- Assad rejected to provide that air support of\nSyrian forces that intervened in favor of Palestine Liberation Organization\n(PLO) in its war with Jordan in what became known as Black September War, which\nled to the failure of the Syrian force’s mission. Accordingly, Salah Gaded\ncalled on 30th of October for an emergency meeting at the level of national\nleadership, to hold the Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad the accountability. The\nmeeting issued its famous decision to remove Hafez al-Assad from the post of\ndefense minister. Hafez al-Assad quickly ordered the army to occupy all the\nbranches of the party with the help of Mustafa Tlass, the chief of staff, and\nRafat al-Assad Hafez’s brother, who headed the security forces. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Salah Gaded was\ndetained besides the President of the Republic, Nour Al Din Al-Atassi \u201cSunni\u201d\non 13\/10\/1970, many of the members of the meeting fled to Lebanon to avoid\ndetention. Maj. Salah remained in Mazza prison until his death on 19th of\nAugust 1993, while Nour Al Din Al-Atassi was released after more than 20 years\nin jail and died shortly afterwards. Many Baathists of Hafiz al-Asad\u2019s\ncomrades, whether the military leaders or civilian received the same destiny. <\/p>\n\n\n\n


                      \nAhmad Hasan Al-Khatib \u201cSunni\u201d was appointed as interim President, then a pro\nforma referendum was held on 22 March 1971 over the coup leader that falsely\ndubbed himself the leader of (Corrective Movement), The government media\nclaimed that 95% of the people participated in the referendum process, which\nwas won by Hafez al-Assad (99.2%). Then he became the first Alawite president to\nSyria for seven years term and followed by similar referendums in 1978, 1985,\n1992 and 1999. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Al Assad played considerably on the\npopulation structure with its extension whether in Syria or in the neighboring\ncountries, either through strengthening or supporting a positions for political\nfigures belongs to certain families or tribes or even from certain cities on\nideological, sectarian and class basis in the regime, or through strengthening\nthe disagreements among them in which serve the objective that Assad aimed at\nfor the purpose of stabilizing his rule. He was aware that the continuation of\nthe regime and its stability in Syria depending on a person who understands the\ndemographic structure well, who also have the ability to use the contradictions\nand divergence as a tool to rule in which he promoted the ethnic class in the\nSyrian society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      In addition to, there was a further\nconfiscation of public freedoms that began in 8th of March 1963, as he\nintegrated the existing parties within meaningless national front with no real\nrole in political life. No party law was issued during his rule, as he\nprevented the establishment of any new parties, and imprisoned any person\nseeking to form a political organization for a period of up to a quarter of a\ncentury. Syria moved from the coups phase to the one-party, and security\nagencies phase, as he harnessed the economy to serve the regime only. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      It was also the solution in Kosovo under\nthe rule of Josip Tito. He did not take into his account the Albanians rights\nand the political, social, economic conditions in which the Albanians suffered,\nwhich ended with demands for independence, this is the situation in Syria.\nAlthough it has not been formally announced, Syria now has three major powers.\nAn area ruled by the ruling regime representing the Alawite community and areas\ncontrolled by Sunni groups in the north and areas controlled by Kurds and Arab\ntribes in the north-east. In the context of comparison, the Kosovo issue is\nsimilar to the problem of each region in Syrian separately.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      4.4\nTHE ROLE OF HAFEZ AL ASSAD’S POLICIES IN SYRIAN CONFLICTS <\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      4.4.1 The Security Policy<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      In their modern history, the Syrians\nexperienced multiple violent events for a number of political conflicts,\nespecially during the rule of Al Assad r\u00e9gime. Hafez al-Assad, who was an air\nforce officer, and little by little came to power, after disposing of his\ncomrades and colleagues then he built an absolute and despotic regime, managed\nto hold all the keys of authority and transformed the state into a security\nagency serving his violent and cohesive power. Al Assad began to stabilize his\nregime through the establishment of several security agencies, that its duties\nwere concentrated on monitoring the citizens, beside; he demanded from the\nsecurity agencies to monitor each other and to raise reports to the head of\npower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                       Hafez\nal-Assad’s main objective, in order to stabilize his rule, was \u201cto disrupt the\nability of the military to carry out any coup.\u201d As he disrupted the functions\nof the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, leaving them like the empty\nstructures without real powers. All the division and brigade commanders and the\nmilitary contingent was linked to him exclusively and individually, he chose\nthem by himself, and encouraged them to compete, so as not to agree against\nhim. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The\nsecurity system in the reign of Al Assad senior consists of Air Force\nIntelligence (AFI), Military intelligence, Political intelligence, and state\nsecurity. These measures were accompanied by the consolidation of sectarian and\nethnic strata in state security and the army. The supreme positions were handed\nover to Alawite officers while Sunni officers have been excluded. Furthermore,\nthe employment system within the security agency was based on sectarian\nallegiance and hence ideological allegiance which mean the loyalty to one-party\n(The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party) These agencies have become involved in the\ndaily affairs of citizens in order to stabilize the ruling regime and to create\nproblems among the components of Syrian people for easy control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      These\nagencies followed Satan\u2019s methods and intimidated all opposition movements.\nThese practices extended to even the movements that were demanding of some\nbasic rights to improve the living conditions, through the threat of Israeli\ndanger on the Arab Nation and Syrian State, the security agencies have promoted\nto fictitious achievements made by Al-Assad in the face of this aggression. But\naddressing issues like the rights of sectarians and ethnic groups was one of the\nissue that could be end with genocide or murder. As such in the Hama Massacre\nin 1982, in which the regime killed thousands of Syrian people and enforced the\nmaterial law. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Hafez\nal-Assad transformed Syria into a security state with its complete description,\nas he doubled the volume, branches and networks of security agencies, and\nexpanded his authority to interfere in any matter. He chose the leaders by his own and linked them with himself directly,\nand deliberately overlapped their powers to facilitate monitoring them. People\nhad gone to Security Officers and Military Officers to address their matters\ninstead of the State institutions, Al Assad also eradicated all oppositions\nforms and he introduced the Brotherhood example during his confrontations with\nthem at the late of the 1970s and the beginning of 1980s as a brutal example to\nhis practices. His brutal practices reached its peak against Syrian\nin1982, as he destroyed a large part of the city of Hama, and killed thousands\nof civilians to provide an example of what he would do against anyone opposing\nhis authority (Aljazeera 2011).[5]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The\nactivities of these agencies have reflected on the structure of Syrian people,\nin particular, the helpless groups and sects. The proportion of inequities has\nincreased with many components of Syrian people that believed that the basic\nrole of the security agencies that have sectarian or socialist ideology was to\nassist Al Assad regime. With regard to the judicial system, the cases were\nadjudicated on the basis of affiliation, not on the basis of rights, which\nraised the repression of the Syrian people. The rift between the components of\nSyrian people has increased and the stratification has been strengthened on the\nregions. There was a way to handle issues belonging to the groups close to Al\nAssad or who are benefited from him, but such way was different from the way in\nwhich the rest of Syrian people handled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Tito’s\nsecurity policy did not differ from Al Assad\u2019s regime policy. Both of them\ndepended on the use the security agencies to stabilize his rule and to fight\nthe opposition movements. At the same time, holding the accountability to any\nattempts seeking for addressing the ethnic and sectarian disputes, which led to\nthe postponement of many injustices and sense of injustice of the oppressed\ngroups for a long time . On the other hand, the security agencies duty limited\nto decriminalize any attempt tends to revolt against the melting into the\none-party pot (The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party in Syria, The Communist Party of\nYugoslavia), thus, both regimes did not establish security agencies\nrepresenting all segments of society and taking into their account the cultural\nand social background and the conflicts. <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                       <\/strong>
                      <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      4.4.2\nThe Demographic Change<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      There\nhas been a change in the way Ba’athist dealt with the demography of the Syrian\nsociety, once Al Assad senior taking over the authority, he practiced selective\npolicies to internally manage this matter, as he used it externally in his\nrelations with regional countries. In his turn, Al Assad attracted the majority\nthrough restoring the radical leftist orientations of the Baath, as well as he\nwas interested to be consistent with the identity of the majority to deny the\nsectarian charges about his regime. On the other\nhand, Al Assad continued in his policies to destroy the main elements of the\nmajority through targeting their security and military institutions and\npromoting the existence of the minority in the state institutions in particular\nAlawites. Externally, Al Assad has used the Kurdish and Shiite paper to obtain\npolitical gains for his regime, whether in his relation with Turkey or with\nIran. In conclusion, Al Assad senior did not target producing a\ndemographic change because he understood the difficulty of this matter but\nintended to manage the demographic matter through critical balance policies\naimed at weakening the Sunni majority in a way that ensures the stability of\nhis regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                       There are events bear witness to the above\nmentioned, in particular when Al Assad relied on Naji Jamil- the mayor of Deir\nal-Zour – in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood, but he did not carry out his\nduty as perfectly as required. Due to the sympathy of the people of Deir al-Zor\nwith them, and the Saddam Hussein’s support to Muslim Brotherhood and the\npeople of Deir al-Zor, at the same time, because the latter was cousins of the\ntribes in central Iraq, whom were the pillar of Saddam Hussein(wakim\n2013.p180). So he replaced them by another Sunni community through providing\nmany advantages for Daraa and Houran tribes, which led to the strengthening of\nSunni figures role during the rule of Hafez al-Asad senior such as: the foreign\nminister Farouk al-Shara, former Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Zu’bi, Deputy\nSecretary General of the Ba\u2019ath Party Suleiman Qaddah, and Brigadier General\nRustam Azal.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      At the same time, he opened the door\ntowards the spread of Iranian culture. For the purpose of causing the change in\nthe fabric of the Syrian society in exchange for keeping some external\ninterests, in order to address the threat of Israel and at the same time to use\nit in his relationship with Arabian Gulf Countries as a trump card. For this\nreason, many Arabian Gulf Countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait financed\nmany projects in the capital Damascus in exchange for reducing the spread of\nShiite in Syria. This policy has had a major impact on Sunnis in Syria, that\nconsidered this policy is a threat to their existence. Furthermore, this policy\nhad a major role in escalating the sectarian dissonance between the Sunni and\nShiite components in Syria, which was strongly present in the events of 2011. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      He also played considerably in fueling\nthe nationalist sentiments pertaining to Kurdish left-wing movements such as\nterrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for the purpose of putting pressure on\nTurkey. Which was the cause of destroying the lives of hundreds of young Kurds\nand separating them from their families at the childhood age. At the same time,\nthe Arab tribes were used to bring about change in the north-eastern areas\ninhabited by the Kurdish components. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      This policy, started under the name of\nland reclamation, whereby a lot of piece of lands owned by the Kurdish\nbourgeois class in north-east Syria distributed to the Arab families – in Ar\nRaqqah and rural southern Aleppo that was affected by the flood. Accordingly,\nthe Kurdish-Arab dispute was deepened in order to stabilize the regime of\nAssad. Which evoked feelings of denunciation and hatred between both components\ntowards each other, which somehow reflected on the cohesion of the Syrian\nsociety for the long-term. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      \n\nThe demographic crisis, in connection\nwith the economic, political, development and moral crisis that Syria\nexperienced at the level of the state and society as a whole, led to the\nemergence of a protest movement in March 2011 which gradually developed into an\nopen war with direct regional and international involvement in the Syrian scene[6]<\/sup><\/a>. .\nIn this war, Al Assad Junior used all the components of the Syrian people\nagainst each other for the purpose of keeping his regime alive as long as\npossible. These disagreements did not appear in public thanks to the false\nslogans of Arab nationalism and the security policy pursued by Assad. However,\nthere was no role to the policy of \u201cbalances\u201d that made the Syrian society at a\nstage of stability throughout the rule of Hafez al-Assad. On the other hand,\nTito also managed to maintain the stability of society by raising nationalist\nslogans and the integration within the scope of the Yugoslav Federation. The\nmechanisms (demographic change) were similar, to stabilize the regime, and it\nis difficult to turn a blind eye about the Socialist and Communist ideology\nwhereby both of them originated.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      4.4.3 The Economic Policies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Once Hafez al-Assad\ncame to power, he attracted the Damascus bourgeois class to secure the\nallegiance of Damascus to his regime. During his rule, that extended between\n1970 and 2000, he pursued one-party policy, as all economic resources were\nunder his control. He nationalized the property of the companies of the private\nsector, that was not nationalized before. Then the nationalization process\nextended to include agricultural land, as his reign was similar to the\nStalinist era in the Soviet Union, and to Yugoslavia state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      The continuity of the\npublic sector was subject to the directions and the relations of \u201cregime\u201d with\nthe Soviet Union or Eastern Europe countries. The Syrian economy was mainly\ndepending on agriculture, although the country is rich in oil and minerals\nresources existing in a large area. Most of investments were confined on the\nrich cities like (Damascus, Aleppo, Lattakia) While there were\nno real investments in the eastern or northern east regions that are rich in\noil resources. Although these regions stretch on an area of large plains\nsuitable for the cultivation of many vegetables and grains, the state’s\ninterest was very weak because of its interest in the oil wealth, which its\nrevenue was confined on specific individuals in the ruling family. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      There\nwas a circulation in using the abusive names for The marginalized regions, as\nmany of these names has spread on the poor regions under the name \u201cremote areas\u201d,\nespecially within the official state specification, and through economic and\neducational state’s plan, even though the fundamentals are available, that\ncould transform these regions to be an economic pillar whose deliver the\nbenefits and relieve many economic problems existing in these regions. All\nSyrian society’s strata were felt that they were not obtained a fair treatment,\nwhich allows to instills the disputes among these strata. Likewise, Albanians\nand Serbs, who blame each other for the poor living conditions that they go\nthrough. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Assad\neconomic policy contributed to strengthening the stratification based on the\nregion location, which led to the emigration of a huge number of people towards\nthe big cities for employment opportunities especially after neglecting their\nsufferance in their regions. He did not pay any attention to the real\nirrigation projects in particular after the drought that hit many agricultural\nareas. These projects could meet the domestic needs and allow the surplus to be\nexported. There was disproportion in the infrastructure, services, and public\nutilities between the big cities and the marginalized regions. The developed\neconomic, commercial, educational and health centers (universities, hospitals\netc…) are not available in a balanced manner between the Syrian cities, where\nmost tourism investments are located along the Syrian coast and in major cities.\nAlthough there are hundreds of tourist sites in various Syrian cities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      Assad\nsenior policy affected two major groups: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                      1. Middle class\n(inside the big cities itself), as they suffered from growing economic burden\nand they are now at risk. <\/li>
                      2.  The marginalized cities in the middle and\nnorthern east of Syria although these cities are rich in many resources and\nowns many economic fundamentals. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

                        These policies evoked\nthe anger of poorer strata that felt that the rich strata are the reason for\ntheir poor living conditions, at the same time created a tense situation\nbetween the larger governorates and the marginalized governorates. For these\nreasons, some Turkmen and Arab tribes demanded secession from the central\nstate, because they did not benefit from any resources existing their land. In\nconclusion, the economic policy of Al Assad was in favor of the personal\ninterests only and confined on certain regions only despite the existence of\nthe economic potential in other regions in the Syrian map. Likewise, Tito preferred\nsome regions in the Federation to the others. As some long-term investments\nconcentrated in the big countries that were already rich. and Kosovo has not\nbeen experienced any projects that could achieve sustainable economic\nstability. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        4.5\nCONSEQUENCES<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The\nconflict had started with protest demonstrations at first, and then evolved to\nmilitary confrontations. Then peaceful popular revolution has started, in which\nSyrian people had been exposed all oppression and suppression methods, in\naddition to; the revolutionaries’ failure to be unified despite the popular\nsupport from the beginning of the revolution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Revolutionaries\nobtained light weapons through the division that occurred in the Syrian\nmilitary, in addition to, many military commanders transformed into the\nopposition, as they formed an entity know as ( National Coalition for\nRevolutionary and Opposition Forces) which replaced the National Council after\nits failure to unify the opposition forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Although\nthe progress made by the armed opposition as it liberated many cities, the\nregime changed his plans and strategies for the purpose of avoiding the\nattrition. Syrian regime focused his power in the important and strategic\ncities, Hezbollah and Shiite militias also engaged in the conflict at the beginning\nof 2013 besides Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which constituted a\ndouble pressure on the opposition that retreated due to the massive\nconfrontations on many fronts, which led to the confusion and uncertainty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Due\nto the uncertainty in the political landscape, the international power had the\nopportunity to intervene in Syria, but their objectives differed according to\ntheir interests. Basher, who killed a thousands of his people and emigrated\nmillions of them, has become a legitimate regime entails protecting him, which\nencouraged Russia to intervene in the conflict after the international\nrecognition of Iran\u2019s existence in Syria and the region as a whole.\nFurthermore, the failure of Sunni opposition to overthrow the Alawite regime that\nbenefited from Iranian support and the multiplicity of armed forces in Syrian\nscene.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Daraa\nwas the first region to revolt against the regime that faced the popular\nrevolution with repression. The demonstrations against the regime extended to\nother governorates such as Banias, Lattakia, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, Damascus and\nits countryside, then the protests and demonstrations extended in its path\ntowards the coastal cities of Latakia and Jabla. Although Al Assad canceled the\nEmergency Law, State Security Court, enacted a law for peaceful protests, as he\nalso released some detainees, formed a new government, granted the nationality\nto dozens of thousands of Kurds, and removed the governor of Homs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        But\nthese political procedures that regime pursued did not reach the minimum\ndemands to the demonstrators. In particular the situation in the streets was\ndifferent from what media transmit, because the confrontation between the\ndemonstrators and the military forces left thousands of dead. The military\nforces carried out various military campaigns on some governorates and cities,\nthe most brutal incident occurred at Baba Amr neighborhood in Homs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Noteworthy,\nthe regime provided insufficient political reforms, in particular, the\nreferendum on the Constitution to cease the domination of the Ba’ath party,\naccording to Syrian what said by media reports, such claims have been made in\nparallel with military campaigns in Hama and other regions such as Homs and\nAdlib.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        In\nthe meantime, the first defection in the military forces has emerged by Hussein\nHarmoush with a group of officers. He established the Free Officers Movement,\nwhich considered as a qualitative step followed by the formation of the Free\nSyrian Army in July from the same year by Lt. Col Riad al-Asaad. Since then,\nthe conflict has become more dangerous than the first, because the\nconfrontation with the regime become militarized, and the Free Syrian Army\nattacked many government buildings most notably the intelligence headquarters\nin the countryside of Damascus. As these confrontations increased, the number\nof officers who were dissident from the ranks of the state\u2019s army increased.\nThe ranks of the Free Army began to increase, reaching about twenty thousand by\nthe end of the first year. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        During\nthe first year of the revolution, the military opposition against the regime,\nwas accompanied by the formation of political opposition entity known as (The\nNational Transitional Council) in August 2011, which headed by Burhan Ghalioun,\nbut the disputes erupted among its members in addition to the members of this\ncouncil were not consistent with the street\u2019s demands , hence its existence\nbecome useless, so it has been replaced by the National Coalition for Syrian\nRevolution and Opposition Forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        On\nthe other hand, the first year of the conflict had witnessed an international\ndiplomatic moves, The most important of which are the new US sanctions on the\nSyrian regime, the European Union also has taken punitive decisions in May 2011\nagainst the regime, but the Americans and Europeans were unable to pass\nresolutions through the Security Council because of Russian-Chinese\u2019s veto,\nthat constituted a major obstacle in front of American-European attempts in\nOctober 2011 and February 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        The\nArab League, in its turn, has sent observers in December 2011, to save what can\nbe saved, but they could not achieve any significant results, hence Syria’s\nmembership in the league was suspended, but Syria sent on conformity with the\nUnited Nation, a joint envoy namely: Former Secretary-General of the United\nNations \u00abKofi Annan\u00bb as a regime’s envoy, accordingly; the regime delivered a\nsuggestions to ride out the crisis, but the continuation of the crisis\nundermined the Arab and international attempts, which pushed some countries in\nthe Gulf Cooperation Council to break off any diplomatic relations with Syrian\nregime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        5.\nCONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        5. 1 CONCLUSION <\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Limiting the reasons of the conflict in\nSyria and Kosovo in the minorities or the basic components that inhabit these\ncountries is not enough despite its importance. In this regard, Elizabeth\nPicard the researcher at the Center for International Studies and Research in\nParis, and the minority specialist, said in her study about Lebanon and the\nKurds cases; the minority\u2019s problem comes from the failure of the modern state\nto achieve its objective that established for; which it is in the Third World\nCounties; the development, and in the West is the welfare and modernization.\nHence, the communities\u2019 loyalty shifted from the state to the public with their\ninterests and desires or to their own culture. The economic problems and the\nforeign interventions also fueled the conflicts and increased them, in addition\nto; the conflict becomes associated with intellectual and cultural movement,\nalongside with the new economic interests, social links, and the structures\nthat are contrary to the state’s policy and its objectives. From this\nstandpoint, the interrelated factors of the conflict that reinforced and formed\nby some internal and external policies of some leaders should be reviewed, as\nthose policies are described as the best way to manage the components of the\npeople and ethnic groups in Syria and Kosovo. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        All the solutions that provided, focused\non the integration in favor of the ideology of (communism), ethnic cleansing\nwhich did not receive any acceptance from any ethnic groups in Syria and\nKosovo, in contrast, it reinforced the ethnic conflicts as the social,\neconomic, and security policies that came from the earlier phases contributed\nto the conflict that Syria and Kosovo witnesses nowadays. This study is\nprepared to the comparison between the problems of both countries to learn from\nthe mistakes, as mentioned above in evaluating the previous experiences to\nlearn from the mistakes, this is where the role of self-constructive critical\nattitude and the political reforms that assist in developing the ruling regimes\nto deal with the changes and to meet the demands of the components of their\npeople. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        These policies established a very complicated\nethnic conflict which its effects extended to many neighboring countries and\neven the rest of the world countries in connection to the security issues and\nrefugee’s crisis that bore the host countries economic, policies, social\nburdens. Ethnic conflict has the potential to spread, infect and impact on the\ninstability internationally and regionally. The situation in Kosovo and Syria\nhas become bloody conflict and costs the conflicting parties hundreds of\nthousands of lives and material and moral losses. Although there was a major\nrole to the security agencies in stirring the conflict through the cruel\ntreatment with the events, that sparked the conflict in Kosovo and Syria. Nor\nTito or Assad Junior seized the opportunity of the long period they spent in\npower as mentioned above to harness the ethnic groups and sectarians to promote\nthe peace in the region. But their policies, through a range of policies,\ncontributed in the conflict the extended after the death of Tito and Al Assad\nin a period not exceeding 11 years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        Table 5.1: Conflict starts after 11 years of death\nTito and Hafez al-Assad<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        \n President\n <\/td>\n Date of Death\n <\/td>\n Date of conflict\n <\/td>\n Difference\n <\/td><\/tr>
                        \n Tito\n <\/td>\n 1980\n <\/td>\n 1991\n <\/td>\n 11 years\n <\/td><\/tr>
                        \n Hafez al-Assad \n <\/td>\n 2000\n <\/td>\n 2011\n <\/td>\n 11 years\n <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

                        In\nthis context, we infer the following: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

                        1. Syria goes through a very complex\nconflict, just like the situation in Kosovo. The policies of the socialist\nregimes have for a long time suppressed the demands of the peoples of the two\nregions, which contributed to the uncontrollable burst of conflict that cannot\nbe controlled by the traditional ways.<\/li>
                        2. The period that both countries\nexperienced, on the pretext of \u201cstability\u201d, cannot be disregarded. Because it\nwas only a phase of \u201cstability\u201d imposed by security policies. <\/li>
                        3. The proportion of minority to the\nmajority does not mean necessarily the strength of the majority, the minority\nmay have the influence over most state institution, accordingly; this issue,\nwhich neglected by all ruling elites in both Syria and Kosovo, is considered as\none of the main causes of the conflict in Kosovo and Syria. In this study, I\nhave determined president Tito and Hafez al-Assad for the following reasons:
                          1. The use of Nation term and\nstirring the nationalist sentiment at the    \nexpense  of the basic rights of\nthe people of Syria and Yugoslavia – have not yet brought about the expected\nresults.<\/li><\/ol>
                            1. Both leaders had many\nopportunities that have not been properly exploited.<\/li><\/ol>
                              1. The absence of reconciliation\nbetween the ethnic groups, that was perceived as a threat to the power of Hafez\nal-Assad and Tito. <\/li><\/ol><\/li>
                              2. Addressing the ethnic\ndiscrimination among the ethnic groups was one of the punishable matters by the\nsocialist communist regime. As they assumed that the national identity and the\nintegration within \u201cthe national identity\u201d is the best solution. But it led to\nthe postponement of grievances of other ethnic groups during the reign of Hafez\nal-Asad and Tito, and increased the anger and fueled the conflict, which paved\nthe way for the external intervention on the basis of protecting the\nminorities.<\/li>
                              3. The\npolicy of creating the balance between the ethnic groups to \u201creduce the tension\u201d\nmeans \u201cdivide and conquer\u201d, was designed for stabilizing the communist regime.\nThe most successful solution is to give the basic rights to the ethnic\nminorities, which create real stability, not the balances policies <\/li>
                              4.  Most of the experiences of ethnic groups began\nwith minor demands but did not take into account. These demands developed later\nto be major inequalities and mistrust, and the subsequent, demand independence.\n<\/li>
                              5. The\nfailure to take these demands into consideration will lead to the emergence of\nparallel entities at an advanced phase to manage the economic, social and\npolitical affairs of minorities within the state at a phase of conflict, this\nwas evident in the conflict between the Albanians and the Serbs as soon as the\n1974 autonomy was abolished. Albanians boycotted all Serbian economic and\npolitical institutions, and established a parallel and alternative institutions\nin Kosovo. The parallel system is managing the educational, health and\nemployment affairs, and are financed by Kosovo Albanians inhabited in Kosovo\nand immigrant communities, accordingly Serbs and Albanians become living\nseparated from each other. <\/li>
                              6. The situation in Syria was not\nmuch different, many civil society organizations and parallel entities have\nemerged, as they manage many sectors that the state restricting them such as\nhealth, security, education, and the basic services. Educational institutions\nhave emerged in the north and east north of Syria to cover the shortage made in\nthis field, and to print curriculum contrary to the regime’s curriculum. . In\naddition to the emergence of some institutions to serve in the security sector\nand the issuance of official papers, in addition to; registering in the Civil\nRegister, issuance of passports. <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n